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The first paper contributes to the existing literature which looks at the effects
of rising temperatures on energy demand, more specifically household energy
consumption. We use a novel methodology to isolate extensive margin adjust-
ments made in response to a changing climate from the intensive margin adjust-
ments made in response to changes in weather. By controlling for both the con-
temporaneous temperature distribution as well as the lagged moving average,
we are gaining on two fronts. Firstly, we are able to get more precise estimates of
the effect of short-run changes in weather on residential energy consumption.
Secondly, by comparing the two effects, we are able to back out the extensive
margin effects on residential energy consumption made in response to changes
in longer term climate. Our estimates imply significant impacts for both the
intensive and the extensive margins and a U-shaped response function of resi-
dential energy consumption with respect to contemporaneous temperature.
Rising income inequality is a cause of concern for policy makers in many
developed and developing countries. Another concern in several developing
countries is the rise in informal settlements. This second paper attempts to con-
nect the two and see if rising income inequality contributes to the problem of
rising informal settlements. We model informal settlements explicitly and show
that having more than two income groups matter in our set up. We find that
rising income inequality does contribute to the welfare of the poor in a negative
way and also leads to a rise in number of informal settlers, hence contribut-
ing to the existing problem. We extend the model further to incorporate tax on
housing in the formal sector and tax revenue going into the provision of public
utilities in the informal sector and look at the effects of rising income inequality.
We also look at movements of households across sectors and find interesting
implications of these to the city equilibrium.
The third paper uses the monocentric city model set up and enhances the
model to include for different types of housing and differences in their respec-
tive construction costs. We show the importance of these features by comparing
the equilibrium to a situation where these features were not there. We find inter-
esting implications of the new features of the model on the city equilibrium. We
show that having the highest bid-rent does not ensure a household a house in
that place. We also do some comparative static analysis and show how changes
in construction costs changes the equilibrium of the city.
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CHAPTER 1
THE SHORT AND LONG RUN IMPACTS OF TEMPERATURE ON U.S.
RESIDENTIAL ENERGY CONSUMPTION
1.1 Introduction
There is a substantial literature which has looked at the effects of climate change
on energy consumption or domestic fuel use. The broad intuition is that due
to climate change the summer months are becoming hotter and in the winter,
there is less cold. Therefore intuitively, one should see a higher consumption of
energy in the summer and a lower consumption of energy during winter. It is
important to note here and distinguish the fact that higher temperatures affect
both the short run and the long run behavior of the households.
The motivation for doing this work is the fact that GHG emissions related
to energy use account 70% of total global emissions. This includes consump-
tion by households as well as industries and our focus in this paper will be
household consumption. The common finding is that in the short run house-
holds respond by using more energy. Climate change will affect energy usage
by changing how agents respond along both intensive and extensive margins
of adjustment. For example, in the short run, they can adjust by using existing
equipment more intensively whereas in response to longer run climatic changes,
they can potentially adjust by buying more equipment such as air conditioners.
Therefore, just controlling for the contemporaneous temperature would give us
two effects, change in residential energy use due to change in weather (weather
is the deviation of today’s temperature from the long-term trend) and change in
energy consumption due to change in climate (long-term trend of temperature).
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Moreover climate impacts our response in two ways, a 1◦F rise in climate trend
would lead to an increase in today’s temperature which would induce house-
holds to change their energy consumption and it can also affect households de-
cision in adjustments in the extensive margin.1 In this paper I use historical
weather data, to estimate the impacts of both contemporaneous weather shocks
as well as long term climate trends on average state-level energy usage for the
US.
In this paper, we use a novel methodology, inspired from the seminal work
of Solon (1992). We create moving averages for each temperature bin and also
control for that in our specification. It captures households reaction to the trends
that they observe, for example a household might choose to buy a new air con-
ditioner in response to the trend that it sees which would increase consumption
of energy. Controlling for moving average of temperatures also gives us more
precise estimates of the contemporaneous effect because if not controlled, the
contemporaneous effect would have been a combined effect of contemporane-
ous change in temperature as well as adaptation to climate change. Dell, Jones,
and Olken (2009, 2012, 2014) also does something similar where they control for
lagged temperatures in their specification in their study of climate change and
income.
We find a U shaped response function for residential energy consumption
as a function of temperatures. Interestingly, we find significant impacts for one
more day in the extreme bins on residential energy consumption. Controlling
for climate, we find significant evidence of adaptation to climate change and
this also allows us to get better estimates of the effects of changes in weather on
residential energy consumption. We also find significant variation of responses
1In this paper we create bins for temperature and use that as a control.
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across climatic regions across the US.
1.2 Literature Review
There are many papers till date which have tried to establish the causal link
between climate and energy consumption and supply but the literatures pri-
mary focus has been on the demand or consumption side. Moreover, even on
the demand side, most of the papers have looked at the residential sector. The
empirical studies on this issue can be broadly divided into two parts- one is
the study about the intensive margin or the short-run and the other is studying
about the extensive margin or the long-run.
Vaage (2000) and Mansur etal. (2008) build discrete choice model of house-
holds fuel choice and uses cross-sectional data for the analysis. Vague uses
Norwegian Central Bureau of Statistics survey of 2289 households’ energy con-
sumption to look at heating technology and energy use in Norway and find
that warmer households spend 30 percent less on fuel. Mansur etal. do a similar
analysis for USA by matching weather data to households and firms survey data
to create a cross-sectional data for their study. Their paper conclude that firms
and households will consume more electricity and oil due to warmer summer
but households will reduce consumption of natural gas as a result of warmer
winters. The primary drawback of using cross-sectional data is that of omitted
variable bias because one cannot control for unobserved heterogeneity across
households and firms which can be potentially correlated to temperatures or
precipitation.
Another strand of the literature uses univariate time series data to do the
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analysis. Franco and Sanstad use data reported by the California Independent
System Operator for 2004, where they explain the time series variation in hourly
load in electricity over a course of one year and regress them on average daily
temperature. They find a non-linear impact on electricity load but a linear im-
pact on maximum temperature on peak demand. Mostly similar but slightly
different approach was uses by Crowley and Joutz (2003), where they look at
the effects of temperature on electricity load. They use hourly data for Pennsyl-
vania, New Jersey and Maryland Interconnection and find that a 3.6◦F rise in
temperature would result in 3-8% rise in consumption of electricity.
Auffhammer and Aroonruengsawat (2011, 2012b) and Deschenes and
Greenstone (2011) are recent papers where they use panel data to study the
problem. The advantage of using panel data is the fact that it allows the econo-
metrician to control for heterogeneity in unobservables. Deschenes and Green-
stone use panel data at the state level in the US for 1963-2002 and conclude
that with “business as usual” residential energy consumption will increase by
11% by 2099.2 On the other hand Auffhammer and Aroonruengsawat (2011,
2012b) uses panel data at the household level and uses information on electric-
ity billings of households in California for the years 2003-2006. Eskeland and
Mideksa (2010) study European countries’ annual electricity demand and find
very small effects of temperature on electricity consumption.
Moving on to the extensive margin, it should be noted that our knowledge
is much limited in comparison to the intensive margin. Rapson (2011) builds
a structural discrete time, infinite horizon model where households choose
whether to but a unit of a durable good or not in each period. The author goes
2Deschenes and Greenstone (2011) use climate prediction models to create bins of future
temperatures.
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on to estimate unit demand elasticity where results show elasticity for central
air conditioner range between 0.7-1 and for room air conditioner range between
0.2-0.3. Akpinar-Ferrand and Singh (2010) study demand for air conditioning
in India. They predict that with a growing economy and higher incomes energy
demand will increase significantly due to air conditioning usage. They predict
that by 2100, with a 3.7◦C increase in temperature, there would be an additional
demand of energy in the range of 750,000 GWh to 1,350,000 GWh.
This paper follows in line with this extensive literature which tries to un-
derstand the different dimensions in which changing climate change human
behavior. Our novel approach allows us to get precise estimates for both the in-
tensive and extensive margin adjustments made by households across the US.
With the estimates in place, one can further take the route taken by Deschenes
and Greenstone (2011) to get precise monetary valuations of predicted change
in residential energy consumption using the climate prediction models.
1.3 Climate Change and Energy Consumption
Climate change is a central topic of interest in policy debates these days. Im-
portantly, the causes and consequences of global warming are not limited to
a particular area or nation, which makes it even more complicated to tackle.
IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), 2014 reports that almost
certainly 95% of global warming is caused due to human activities. They pre-
dict that during the 21st century, if one considers the lowest emissions model,
surface temperatures are likely to rise by 0.5−3.1◦F and it might go up to a range
of 4.7−8.6◦F if one considers the highest emissions model. Coal, petroleum and
5
natural gas are our main sources of energy in present times. It is estimated that
around 86% of total energy used in 2005 was due to fossil fuel combustion and
in the US it was about 85%. Fossil fuels also contribute to climate change since
they contribute to around 80% of greenhouse gas emissions and 98% to CO2
emissions. Natural gas, which is one of the biggest energy sources for residen-
tial energy consumption is also considered to be a huge contributor to global
warming because of the tremendous energy required to liquefy and transport
it to different places. Figure 1.1 shows the major contributors to CO2 emissions
from fossil fuel and one can see that the US and China are the highest contribu-
tors. Therefore, in the situation we are in, it is important to study the behavior
of economic agents and how they respond to climate change.
6
Source: IPCC Report, 2014.
Figure 1.1: Major Contributors to CO2 Emissions
In the US, residential sector is one of the major users of energy and figure
1.2 shows the energy consumption of households by different end-uses for the
years 1993 and 2009. The figure shows that proportion of total energy used has
decreased for space heating but has increased for cooling and appliances, elec-
tronics and lighting. It is true that over the years due to changes in technology,
housing types, there has been decrease in energy consumption per capita but
total energy consumption by the residential sector has been increasing. Fig-
ure 1.3 from the US Energy Information Administration shows that there is
steady increase in residential energy consumption except for 2016 and that is
indeed a substantial portion of the total energy consumption. For the last year
7
in our sample, that is 2013, residential energy consumption accounts for ap-
proximately 22% of the total consumption of energy in primary use. Figure
1.4 shows the total residential energy used from 1980 − 2009 for the four broad
climatic regions in the US which shows that over this time period, residential
energy consumption has been increasing more for the West and South in com-
parison to the other two climatic regions.
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration
Figure 1.2: Residential Energy Consumption by End Uses (1993 vs 2009)
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Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration
Figure 1.3: Energy Consumption by Sector (2012 to 2016)
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration
Figure 1.4:
9
Figure 1.5 from the US Energy Information Administration gives us some
idea about the usage of air conditioners and space heating over the period of
1980 − 2009. We can clearly see that there has been substantial increase in usage
of air conditioner and space heating and therefore this should result in higher
residential energy consumption.
A better understanding of the behavior of households in necessary for sus-
tainable development. This paper contributes in that respect, since a better un-
derstanding of household response to changing temperatures would allow us
to predict the future impact in a more precise manner. The period under study
has coincided with steady penetration of heating and cooling facilities in the US.
Therefore, this might also help in understanding the how demand of residential
energy will change in other countries where cooling and heating facilities have
not yet penetrated.
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1.4 Data and Summary Statistics
In this analysis we have used detailed data on climate variables,more specifi-
cally temperature and precipitation and data on household energy consump-
tion and state level data on population and GDP. In what follows, we discuss
the sources of the data and how they have been aggregated at the state level in
order for us to do the analysis.
Climate Data: The data on daily temperatures and rainfall has been collected
from the National Climatic Data Centers Cooperative Station Data (NOAA
2008) for 1965-2013. This dataset provides detailed information on daily temper-
atures and precipitation which is collected using 20000 weather stations spread
across the entire US. The key variables for us are the daily maximum and mini-
mum temperatures and the daily precipitation and we have used the daily max-
imum and minimum temperatures to construct the daily mean temperature at
the weather station level. Then we match stations to counties for each year and
use the weather stations within 200 kms radius of each county centroid. 3 We
compute the average weather across all weather stations within 200 kms radius
from the county centroid and use the inverse distance square as weights to get
all daily weather data at the county level. In order to aggregate to the county-
year level, we compute the total yearly rainfall in a county and then create in-
dicator variables based on annual rainfall in a county. Each indicator variable
corresponds to a 10-inch bin of annual total rainfall and we have 7 bins ranging
from below 10 inches to above 60 inches. For the data on temperature we first
create bins starting from less than 10◦F to greater than 90◦F, with 10◦F intervals
in between. Then, using these, we calculate the number of days in a year that a
3We have also considered radius of 100, 150 and 250 kms, the results are in the robustness
section.
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county has experienced temperatures in each of the 10 bins. Finally, we take av-
erage, weighted by the population in each county, to aggregate all our relevant
variables to the state-year level.
We also construct moving average of the average temperature for each day
for every county and follow the same process as described above to construct
moving average of the climate variables for each state for the years 1975-2013.
The construction of the moving averages gives us the long-term climatic trends
for every state. We try to separate climatic trends to climate shocks to get
at adaptation to climate change. More specifically, controlling for climatic
trends/weather would allow us to isolate the intensive margin and extensive
margin adjustment is response to changing climate. A more detailed explana-
tion is in the next section. Figure 1.6 compares the distribution of contempora-
neous temperature to the distribution of the 5 years moving average of mean
temperatures that have been constructed by the method discussed above. We
can see from the figure that there are signs of more extreme temperatures than
before, especially for the two extreme bins where we can see that the average
number of days in the lowest bin is higher for contemporaneous temperature
and the opposite is true for the other extreme. We can also see that except for
the extreme two temperature bins on either side of the distribution, the num-
ber of days in the bins from 20◦ − 80◦F are more for 5 years moving average in
comparison to the contemporaneous temperatures.
Energy Data: We have taken the energy data from the U.S. Energy Infor-
mation Administration (EIA) State Energy Data System and we are using data
from 1975-2013. The comprehensive data source has information on energy
consumption by households, industrial sector and transportation services. In
13
Notes: This figure represents the temperature distributions of the contemporaneous and
moving average variables. Each bar represents the average number of days in each
temperature bin. Averages are constructed across all states and years in sample.
Figure 1.6: Comparison: Distributions of the Contemporaneous and 5 Yr Mov-
ing Average Temperature
14
this paper, we focus on the residential energy consumption which is recorded
in British Thermal Units (BTU) and the data also includes state level energy
prices, state level population and GDP. The data used as consumption of en-
ergy by residents of a state is an aggregate of primary energy use and the loss
in energy due to transmission and distribution of energy. As has been noted in
Greenstone and Deschenes (2011), this loss in energy due to transmission etc.
accounts for about two-thirds of total energy consumption. Given, the fact that
climate data is available at the station level, we could have potentially done the
analysis at the county level and this would have saved us from potential errors
of aggregating at the state level but the unavailability of detailed data on energy
consumption the county level leaves us with no other choice than to do it at the
state level.
Table 1.1 presents the summary statistics for our variables of interest for the
entire US and across 9 different climatic regions. The first four columns present
information on the residential energy consumption and the last four columns
present information on average daily temperature. As expected, we see signifi-
cant variation in energy consumption and average temperatures across the US.
West, South and Southwest have the highest three mean temperatures in our
data and its effect on residential energy consumption is also reflected by the fact
that their energy consumption is on the higher side. Table 1.2 given summary
statistics for the extreme temperature bins in our paper. We see that average
number of days in the contemporaneous temperatures bins is higher than the
average number of days in the corresponding moving average bins.
Figures 1.7 and 1.8 gives us some idea about the correlation between resi-
dential energy consumption and the climate. Figure 1.7 uses 5 years moving
15
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics: Number of Days that Contemporaneous and 5
Year Moving Average Temperature is in Extreme Bins
Mean Standard Deviation Maximum
Number of Days TMeanCont is
Below 10 F 5.83 10.16 78.81
10-20 F 11.16 11.13 49.30
80-90 F 21.51 27.25 130.38
Above 90 F 1.31 5.84 48.51
Number of Days TMeanMA is
Below 10 F 1.83 6.20 51.39
10-20 F 9.44 15.00 68.71
80-90 F 15.64 27.10 120.73
Above 90 F 0.90 4.82 44.61
Notes: This table has been constructed by using 1872 state-year observations over the years
1975-2013. The numbers reported are capture the average number of days that the current
year’s average temperature is in the four extreme temperature bins. The bottom panel reports
the same for the past five years’ moving average of temperature.
average as a notion of climate and Figure 1.8 uses 10 years moving average as
a measure of climate. Both the figures show that residential energy consump-
tion and our different measures of climate are highly correlated. Figures 1.9
and 1.10 show the correlation of 5 and 10 years moving averages to residential
energy consumption across different climatic regions and the correlations are
quite promising. However, as we will see later, the number of observations for
some regions if fairly low and that might be a possible issue in the estimation
process. In a small section, later on, we will also use maximum and minimum
temperatures to see if extreme temperatures have any effect on residential en-
ergy consumption.
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Notes: This figure represents the mean annual log residential energy consumption and the
mean 5-year moving average of temperature, averaged across all states, for each year. The
variables have been detrended in order to eliminate the time trend.
Figure 1.7: Relationship between Residential Energy Consumption and 5 Yr
Moving Average Temperature
Notes: This figure represents the mean annual log residential energy consumption and the
mean 5-year moving average of temperature, averaged across all states within a given climate
region, for each year. The variables have been detrended in order to eliminate the time trend.
Figure 1.8: Relationship between Residential Energy Consumption and 5 Yr
Moving Average Temperature by Climate Regions
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Notes: This figure represents the mean annual log residential energy consumption and the
mean 10-year moving average of temperature, averaged across all states within a given climate
region, for each year. The variables have been detrended in order to eliminate the time trend.
Figure 1.9: Relationship between Residential Energy Consumption and 10 Yr
Moving Average Temperature by Climate Regions
Notes: This figure represents the mean annual log residential energy consumption and the
mean 10-year moving average of temperature, averaged across all states, for each year. The
variables have been detrended in order to eliminate the time trend.
Figure 1.10: Relationship between Residential Energy Consumption and 10 Yr
Moving Average Temperature
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The following two figures (Figure 1.11 and Figure 1.12) shows the correlation
of residential energy consumption with maximum and minimum temperature
respectively. We will use the maximum and minimum temperature data in a
minor analysis later.
Notes: This figure represents the mean annual log residential energy consumption and the
mean 5-year moving average of daily maximum temperature, averaged across all states, for
each year. The variables have been detrended in order to eliminate the time trend.
Figure 1.11: Relationship between Residential Energy Consumption and 5 Yr
Moving Average of Maximum Temperature
Notes: This figure represents the mean annual log residential energy consumption and the
mean 5-year moving average of daily minimum temperature, averaged across all states, for
each year. The variables have been detrended in order to eliminate the time trend.
Figure 1.12: Relationship between Residential Energy Consumption and 5 Yr
Moving Average of Minimum Temperature
20
1.5 Empirical Methodology
The conceptual framework of this paper is similar to Deschenes and Greenstone
(2011) where they lay down a simple model to show how the effect of temper-
ature on energy consumption enters the households willingness to pay/accept
for a degree change in temperature. Since price data is available, one can mul-
tiple the estimated coefficient with the price to get the monetary value. This
simple model does not completely capture what we are trying to do in this pa-
per but serves a basic foundation from which we can build ours. The key idea
of this paper is to segregate the effects of intensive margin adjustments and ex-
tensive margin adjustments in residential energy consumption in response to
temperature changes. The objective for having bins of temperatures instead of
the temperatures themselves is to see if there are any non-linear effects across
different bins, that is to estimate if economic agents respond more in the in-
tensive or the extensive margin due to extreme temperatures. We do this the
extending Deschenes and Greenstone (2011) to incorporate climate trends as ad-
ditional control in the model. This paper also deviates from the literature which
uses “heating degree days (HDD) and “cooling degree days” (CDD) because
this approach is not capable of capturing the non-linear impacts across different
temperature bins.
In order to estimate the causal effect of temperature on residential energy
consumption and get at our measure of adaptation to climate change, we exploit
variation in contemporaneous daily average temperatures as well as the long
term temperature trend (i.e. the climate normal), as given by the 5 year mov-
ing average of temperature. Following Deschenes and Greenstone (2011), and
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modifying their specification, we estimate the following econometric model:
ln(Cst) =
∑
j
βContj TMean
Cont
st j +
∑
l
γ
Prep
l Prepstl+Xstδ+
∑
j
βMAj TMean
MA
st j +αs+θdt+st,
where s denotes state, t denotes year and d indexes the climate regions as de-
fined by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The
variable TMeanContst j denotes the average number of days in state s and year t, where
the daily mean temperature is in the jth temperature bin. We have first cal-
culated the number of days that daily mean temperature is in each of our 11
temperature bins, for each county-year and then averaged this to the state level.
As discussed earlier, in order to control for historical temperature trends, we
also control for TMeanMAst j which denotes the average number of days in state s and
year t, where the 5 year moving average of daily mean temperature is in the jth
temperature bin. Hence, the only functional form restriction that we assume
here is that the impact of current as well as moving average of temperature on
residential energy consumption is constant within 10◦F intervals. βContj captures
the effect of an additional day that the contemporaneous temperature was in bin
j whereas βMAj captures the effect of an additional day that the historical average
temperature was in bin j. We also include state fixed effects (αs), climate region
by year fixed effects (θdt) and a stochastic error term (st). In addition to this we
also control for state population and GDP. 4
The way we model temperature is as follows: Contemporaneous temperature=
Moving Average of Temperature (climate) +Shock (weather). In our specification,
when one only controls for contemporaneous temperature, the coefficient cap-
tures two components. It captures the responses in energy consumed 1) if there
is change is weather 2) if there is a change in the climate. The change in climate
4Additionally squared population and GDP have been controlled in the robustness section.
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has two effects: it changes the contemporaneous temperature and it also induces
changes made by the households in the extensive margin (for example, buying
a new air conditioner). Therefore, in addition to contemporaneous temperature,
when we control for the moving average of temperatures (climate), the coeffi-
cient of the contemporaneous temperature captures only response to a change
in the shock (weather) component of the contemporaneous temperature. Hence,
to get at the extensive margin adjustment we need to look at the difference in
the estimates of the coefficients of the moving average (climate) and contempo-
raneous temperatures. βContj captures households reaction to contemporaneous
change in temperatures and βMAj captures household’s reaction to the trend of
temperatures that they see in the previous years. So, the difference between the
two estimates gives us a measure of adjustment in the extensive margin (adap-
tation to climate change). Suppose there is no adaptation to climate change in
any way, then the effect of an additional day in some bin for the moving average
and the contemporaneous weather should be the same and hence βContj should
not be significantly different from βMAj . If, say for some reason, household before
more environment conscious or are simply getting used to higher temperatures
in summer or lower temperatures in winter, then we would expect βContj > β
MA
j .
On the other hand, if people are just responding by buying more AC’s or using
more and more heating in winters, then we would expect βContj < β
MA
j .
1.6 Results
In this section, we will discuss the key findings of this paper. Firstly, we will
look at pooled estimates for all the states in US for the years 1975-2013. These
results will consider 5 years moving average as a measure of climate and we will
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also get into a detailed analysis of the regional impacts of temperature on energy
consumption by households. Then we will move on to analyze how different
notions of climate might affect our estimates. More specifically, if we change
our notion of climate from 5 years moving average to 10 years moving average,
then the key question is whether the results change and if so, then why do they
change. This will be followed by a small section which will look at whether
maximum temperatures or minimum temperatures have any substantial effect
on the intensive or the extensive margin with regards to energy consumption.
1.6.1 Main Results
Table 1.3 shows the impact of changes in temperature on energy consumption
by households for all the states in the US. The first two columns of the table do
not include the 5 years moving average of temperatures and therefore looks at
the effect of one more day in any of the 9 bins considered in the model on the
energy consumption. Columns 3 and 4 shows results after controlling for the 5
years moving averages and as mentioned before it helps us in two ways. Firstly,
controlling for the moving average or our notion of climate in the model, yields
a better estimate of the contemporaneous effects and secondly it gives us scope
of talking about how households react in the extensive margin. The coefficients
reported in the table are relative to energy consumption on a day where the
temperature is in the range of 50 − 60◦F and we report the coefficients for the
lowest two and the highest two bins of temperatures.
As it has been noted recently in the literature 5, we also find an inverted
U shape in the response function of energy consumption to temperature. In
5Deschenes and Greenstone (2011) also find a non-linear response function.
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Table 1.3: Main Estimates-Effect of Temperature on Residential Energy Con-
sumption (5-Yr Moving Average)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
No. of Days TMeanCont ≤ 10◦ F 0.0044*** 0.0047*** 0.0043*** 0.0045***
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0007)
No. of Days 10◦F ≤ TMeanCont < 20◦F 0.0031*** 0.0032*** 0.0033*** 0.0034***
(0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007)
No. of Days 80◦F < TMeanCont ≤ 90◦F 0.0023*** 0.0023*** 0.0019*** 0.0019***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004)
No. of Days TMeanCont > 90◦F 0.0043*** 0.0042*** 0.0032*** 0.0031***
(0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0010) (0.0010)
No. of Days TMeanMA ≤ 10◦F 0.0039 0.0045*
(0.0025) (0.0024)
No. of Days 10◦F < TMeanMA ≤ 20◦F 0.0048** 0.0051***
(0.0020) (0.0019)
No. of Days 80◦F < TMeanMA ≤ 90◦F 0.0022* 0.0023*
(0.0012) (0.0012)
No. of Days TMeanMA > 90◦F 0.0047** 0.0041*
(0.0022) (0.0023)
Population and GDP Y Y Y Y
Population x GDP N Y N Y
Observations 1,872 1,872 1,872 1,872
Notes: Regressions include state fixed effects and climate region-by-year fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the state level. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level respectively.
our preferred specifications (columns 2 and 4 respectively of table 1.3) we see
that the response to changes in contemporaneous temperatures are higher for
the extreme two bins of temperatures. We find that when we are not control-
ling for the climate (or moving averages) the coefficient of one extra day in any
of the two extreme bins is in the range of 0.43 − 0.44 and they are highly sig-
nificant. As we have seen in the previous section, once we include the bins for
moving averages, the coefficient of the contemporaneous temperatures will cap-
ture just the effect of the shock component in the temperature. Subtracting the
coefficient of the contemporaneous temperatures from the coefficient obtained
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for the bins of the moving averages will give us a measure of extensive mar-
gin adaptation. Interestingly, when we control the moving average, the impact
of contemporaneous temperatures on energy consumption for the highest bin
drops to 0.0031 and noting that the coefficient of the moving average is 0.0041,
we can say that when one does not control for the climate, a substantial por-
tion of the effect of contemporaneous temperature on energy consumption is
because of adjustments in the extensive margin. In our data, we find that the
in response to change in climate, the coefficient which gives the impact on res-
idential energy consumption 0.10 higher than it would be had there been no
extensive margin adjustment for the highest temperature bin. We also find sig-
nificant effects but of lower magnitude for the second highest temperature bin
and the proportion of the effect on energy consumption which can be attributed
to adjustments in the extensive margin is in similar range to what we found for
the highest temperature bin. For the lowest two bins of temperatures, we find
significant impacts of one more day in any of those bins and the coefficients of
the moving averages suggest that there is no significant adjustment in the ex-
tensive margin for the lowest bin but there is significant adjustment for the bin
with temperatures 10−20◦F. This seems to suggest that households who experi-
ence one more day in the bin with temperatures less than 10◦F are already well
equipped and need not make any changes in the extensive margin to combat
lower temperatures. We will use the coefficients obtained for the contempo-
raneous temperatures after controlling for the moving averages to get an idea
about how changes in temperatures will affect energy consumption at the end
of the century.
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1.6.2 Responses to Longer Term Climate Trends
In this section, we will expand our analysis to look at different notions of cli-
mate and how they influence our results. The primary motivation behind using
the moving averages as additional controls is to isolate the adjustment to the
extensive margin from the reaction in the intensive margin. One important as-
pect of our paper is the way we model contemporaneous temperature, we say
that contemporaneous temperature is the moving average of temperature and
some shock to the moving average. In this section, we want to see how agents
react to longer term climatic trends since it is possible that the knowledge of
a bigger past might influence agents long-run or extensive margin decisions.
Table 1.4 shows the results when we consider 10 years moving average as a
measure of climate. The first two columns give us the impacts of contempo-
raneous temperatures on energy consumption when we do not control for the
moving averages. The last two columns give us the impact of one more day in a
year in a particular temperature bin on energy consumption when one controls
for the climate trends. In our preferred specification, which is column 4 of the
table, we find that the coefficients for the contemporaneous temperature bins
are highly significant and are in similar ranges to what we got when we used
the 5 year moving averages. We also find significant effect for the moving aver-
age bin with temperatures between 10−20◦F and we find bigger adjustments in
the extensive margin in this case in comparison to the case when we controlled
for 5 years moving average. This result is in line with the intuition that over a
longer period agents would adjust more in the extensive margin. One should
also note that we do not find significant results for the coefficients of the other
moving average bins but still controlling for this has a substantial impact on the
coefficients of the contemporaneous temperatures, as this helps in getting rid of
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bias one would have in the estimates of the coefficients of the contemporaneous
temperature if one does take into account the extensive margin adjustments.
Table 1.4: Effect of Temperature on Residential Energy Consumption (10-Yr
Moving Average)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
No. of Days TMeanCont ≤ 10◦F 0.0044*** 0.0047*** 0.0040*** 0.0042***
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008)
No. of Days 10◦F ≤ TMeanCont < 20◦F 0.0031*** 0.0032*** 0.0030*** 0.0031***
(0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007)
No. of Days 80◦F < TMeanCont ≤ 90◦F 0.0023*** 0.0023*** 0.0018*** 0.0019***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004)
No. of Days TMeanCont > 90◦F 0.0043*** 0.0042*** 0.0030*** 0.0030***
(0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0010) (0.0010)
No. of Days TMeanMA ≤ 10◦F 0.0025 0.0035
(0.0029) (0.0029)
No. of Days 10◦F < TMeanMA ≤ 20◦F 0.0044* 0.0051**
(0.0023) (0.0022)
No. of Days 80◦F < TMeanMA ≤ 90◦F 0.0003 0.0004
(0.0019) (0.0018)
No. of Days TMeanMA > 90◦F 0.0015 0.0008
(0.0027) (0.0027)
Population and GDP Y Y Y Y
Population x GDP N Y N Y
Observations 1,872 1,872 1,872 1,872
Notes: Regressions include state fixed effects and climate region-by-year fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered at the state level. ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level respectively.
1.6.3 Climatic Regions
In this section, we have divided all the states into 9 different climatic regions to
look at the heterogeneity of effects across different regions in the US and table
1.5 reports the estimates. We have considered the 5 years moving average as a
measure of climate and report the results for our preferred specification where
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we also control population and GDP in addition to rainfall. The objective of this
section is twofold. On one hand, it allows us to show that there is substantial
variation in response of energy consumption to temperature changes and hence
results from studies which focus on a particular state or region should be treated
with caution as there might be issues of external validity. On the other hand, al-
though limited to a certain degree due to low number of observations for each
climatic region we are still able to get some interesting observations. We are
not reporting results for the region West since the number of observations are
too low and there is not much variation is the data for getting anything mean-
ingful from the regressions. As noted by Deschenes and Greenstone (2011), for
the regions, we find better results for the lower temperature bins in compari-
son to the higher temperature bins because of lack of observations in the higher
temperature bins. For the bin with less than 10◦F we find significant effects in
the coefficient for the contemporaneous temperatures in the regions Ohio Val-
ley, Upper Midwest, North-East, South and Rockies with values ranging from
0.0019 − 0.0058. For the highest temperature bin (greater than 90◦F) we have
some evidence for the effect of contemporaneous temperatures in the Ohio Val-
ley and Midwest. In terms of evidence for adjustments in the extensive margin,
we find positive evidence in the North-East region. As mentioned before, the
objective of this section was not to delve too much into the actual numbers be-
cause of data constraints. We think we have been able to show two things- firstly
we show that there is variation across climatic regions with respect to reaction
to temperature changes and also the lower values of coefficients found here in
comparison to the literature shows controlling for the climate is important and
helps us in getting better estimates of the contemporaneous effects.
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1.6.4 Responses to Extreme Temperatures
In this section, we want to investigate whether economic agent’s decision de-
pends on its experience of extreme temperatures. The average temperature used
in the previous section was computed using the daily maximum and minimum
temperatures, so the average temperature will certainly incorporate the effect of
a very high temperature or a very low temperature. But significant difference
between the maximum and minimum temperatures might not fully capture if
experiences of extremely temperatures has any effect on decision making of eco-
nomic agents with regards to energy consumption.
Now the key question is the potential economic reason for such an effect.
Extreme temperatures today might be an indicator for extreme temperatures to-
morrow and households or economic agents might react in the extensive margin
because of that. For example, in a certain place, in recent years the minimum
temperature might be getting lower than what it usually is, then one might think
of buying a new heater. Note that this affect would be captured to some ex-
tent when we use the average temperatures but instead if we use the maximum
temperatures or minimum temperatures, we can get some idea whether apart
from observing the average climate trends and making extensive margin adjust-
ments, does extreme temperatures also play a role in adjustment in the extensive
margin.
Therefore, in order to investigate whether extreme temperatures have any
effect on residential energy consumption, we create bins for extreme tempera-
tures. More specifically, using the same methodology, as explained in the data
section for the average temperatures, we create bins of temperatures for the
maximum temperatures and the minimum temperatures. For the maximum
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temperatures, we have bins from less than 50◦F to greater than 90◦F with inter-
vals of 10◦F in between and for the minimum temperatures we have bins for less
than 10◦F to greater than 50◦F with intervals of 10◦F in between. We use 5 years
moving average as a notion of climate in this section. We separately run regres-
sions with the maximum and minimum temperatures and we find significant
impacts of extreme temperatures on residential energy consumption. Tables 1.6
and 1.7 report the estimated impacts of the maximum and minimum tempera-
tures respectively on residential energy consumption. We have also constructed
and controlled for bins for moving average of maximum and minimum temper-
atures. We find significant impacts of extreme temperatures on extensive mar-
gin adjustments made by households, which suggest that households not only
react to average temperatures but extreme climate events can potentially play
an important role in residential energy consumption. It is worth noting that we
should not be expecting the coefficients of the contemporaneous maximum and
minimum temperatures to be similar to the coefficients of the contemporaneous
average temperatures since the maximum and minimum only captures a part of
the average temperatures. Additionaly, we also find some evidence of extensive
margin adjustment for maximum temperatures in the Northeast and Southwest
regions. For the minimum temperature, we find some similar impact for the
Northeast region. Tables 1.8 and 1.9 report the results for the regional impacts
for maximum and minimum temperatures respectively.
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Table 1.6: Effect of Maximum Temperature on Residential Energy Consumption
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
No. of Days TMaxCont ≤ 50◦F 0.0021*** 0.0021*** 0.0022*** 0.0022***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
No. of Days TMaxCont > 90◦F 0.0012*** 0.0012*** 0.0011*** 0.0011***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
No. of Days TaxMA ≤ 50◦F 0.0028** 0.0027**
(0.0012) (0.0012)
No. of Days TMaxMA > 90◦F 0.0020** 0.0020**
(0.0008) (0.0008)
Population and GDP Y Y Y Y
Population x GDP N Y N Y
Observations 1,872 1,872 1,872 1,872
Notes: Regressions include state fixed effects and climate region-by-year fixed effects.
Regressions report responses to daily maximum temperatures and 5 year moving averages of
the same. 10◦F bins have been constructed based on the distribution of daily maximum
temperatures. Estimates of the two most extreme bins have been reported. All estimates are
relative to the intermediate bin of 70-80◦F. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. ***,
** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table 1.7: Effect of Minimum Temperature on Residential Energy Consumption
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
No. of Days TMinCont ≤ 10◦F 0.0024*** 0.0025*** 0.0025*** 0.0026***
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0005)
No. of Days TMinCont > 60◦F 0.0013** 0.0012** 0.0008** 0.0008**
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004)
No. of Days TMinMA ≤ 10◦F 0.0032** 0.0036**
(0.0016) (0.0015)
No. of Days TMinMA > 60◦F 0.0028*** 0.0027**
(0.0010) (0.0010)
Population and GDP Y Y Y Y
Population x GDP N Y N Y
Observations 1,872 1,872 1,872 1,872
Notes: Regressions include state fixed effects and climate region-by-year fixed effects.
Regressions report responses to daily minimum temperatures and 5 year moving averages of
the same. 10◦F bins have been constructed based on the distribution of daily minimum
temperatures. Estimates of the two most extreme bins have been reported. All estimates are
relative to the intermediate bin of 30-40◦F. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. ***,
** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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1.7 Robustness
In this section, we will modify our primary specification in a number of different
ways and see if our results are robust to minor tweaks in the model. Broadly,
we will make changes to the specification in three different dimensions. As
has been noted in the data section, we considered weather stations within a
distance of 200 kilometers from the county centroid for constructing the weather
variables. We will consider three variations with respect to the distance unto
which the weather stations will be considered for construction of the climate
variables. Next, we will consider a different notion of climate. In our current
specification, we assume that households get one year to make extensive margin
adjustments. We would change this model and model climate such that they
have more time to make adjustments to the extensive margin and we will do
this by controlling for lagged moving averages. Finally, we will further make
changes to our specification by including more controls which shall capture the
non-linear impacts of population and GDP and their interaction on residential
energy consumption.
The main results reported in the previous section use weather variables
which were constructed by considering weather stations which are within 200
kilometers from the centroid of a country. After that bins for the weather vari-
ables were created and aggregated to the state level by using county popula-
tion as weights. We change the radius and consider weather stations which are
within 100, 150 and 250 kilometers respectively from the centroid of the county.
A similar procedure has been followed to aggregate the data at the state level.
Table 1.10 reports the estimates for the three different radii, columns 1, 3 and
5 report estimates for the three cases when we do not control for the moving
37
averages and columns 2, 4 and 6 report estimates for the three cases when we
control for the moving averages. As we did for our preferred specification in the
previous section, we consider 5 years moving average as a measure of climate.
As we see in table three our estimates are robust to different variations in the
construction of the weather variables. Estimates for both the contemporaneous
temperatures and for the moving averages do not vary much across different
radii and they are not significantly different from the estimates we had for our
preferred specification (see table 1.3) in the main results. As we had seen in the
results section, there is significant impacts for all the four bins reported in table
1.10, for both the contemporaneous temperatures and the moving averages. For
the lower end of the temperature distribution, we find evidence of adjustment
in the extensive margin because of one more day in the bin with temperatures
between 10 − 20◦F. For the other extreme temperature bins, we find evidence
of extensive margin adjustment for both the bins reported. The change is radii
changes the number of weather stations considered in the sample. Overall, we
find that our results do not change significantly when we reduce or increase the
number of weather stations considered in our specification.
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Next, we change the time a household has to make adjustments to the exten-
sive margin and see how the results change. The way we have modeled climate
in this paper is that we have controlled for 5 year moving averages in addition
to the contemporaneous temperatures. Previously, we were controlling for con-
temporaneous temperatures of year t (say) and additionally we were controlling
for 5 years moving average of temperatures which is for the period t − 1 to t − 5.
Now, we will consider 5 years moving averages but will compute that using
temperatures for periods t − 4 to t − 8, which implies that to control for 3 years
lagged 5 years moving average. One implication this change has on the model
is the fact that it changes the time the households get to adjust in the extensive
margin. Previously, our model allowed for changes in climate to affect residen-
tial energy consumption through a one year lag. On the contrary, this model
allows households to react to changes in climate through a three year lag. In-
tuitively, it is not straight forward to predict the behavior of households in this
scenario. On the one hand, it might be the case that households get more time
to react when there is a two year lag and hence one should expect more adjust-
ment in the extensive margin since households have more time to adjust. On
the other hand, lagged moving average might not be a good representation for
climate in our model because it might be more difficult for households to think
about lagged moving averages and hence we might expect a lower extensive
margin adjustment when we control for lagged moving averages in compari-
son to 1 year lagged moving averages. Another thing that should be noted here
is that the estimates for the contemporaneous temperature bins when we control
for lagged moving averages should not be significantly different to the scenario
where we do not have the lag.
Table 1.11 reports the results where we consider three different lags in the
40
model, more specifically 2 years, 3 years and 4 years lagged moving average.
The results show that as one would expect, the estimates of the impact of one
more day in the extreme temperature bins of contemporaneous temperatures
are not significantly different from the estimates in table 1.3 where we had a
one year lag. Columns 2, 4 and 6 table 1.11 report estimates for 2, 3 and 4 years
lagged moving average for our preferred specification. As for the estimates of
the moving average bins, we do not find any significant effect expect for the bin
of 10 − 20◦F. This shows that lagged moving average might not be a good rep-
resentation of climate and the fact that the difference between the coefficient of
moving average and contemporaneous temperatures decreases in comparison
to the difference obtained in column 4 of table 1.3 shows that households might
not remember lagged moving average that well and hence it might not capture
climate properly. Moreover, this is further supported by the fact that the coef-
ficient of the moving average bin of 10 − 20◦F decreases when we increase the
lag.
Finally, we include squared values of population and GDP in our specifica-
tion in order to check if there are non-linear effects of population and GDP on
residential energy consumption and if that is confounding our results in any-
way. Table 1.12 reports the results after adding these two additional controls.
Column 3 in table 1.12 shows that results do not change significantly in com-
parison to our preferred specification in table 1.3 except for the moving average
of the bin with temperatures greater than 90◦F. Column 4 of table 1.12 shows
that if we also control for the interaction of squared population and GDP, then
we find significant impact for the contemporaneous temperatures and for the
bins 10 − 20◦F and 20 − 90◦F. This suggests that our main results in table 1.3
might have overestimated the effect of climate on residential energy consump-
41
tion but nonetheless significant impacts in the other moving average bins shows
that it is important to control for climate in the specification. This might also
suggest that households are already well-equipped to cope with an additional
day in the two extreme temperature bins and hence they do not need to make
any adjustments in the extensive margin. This shows that even after controlling
for squared population and GDP and their interaction, we still find evidence of
extensive margin adjustment and our results for the contemporaneous temper-
atures are quite stable across specifications.
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1.8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have used a novel methodology to look at the intensive and
extensive margin adjustments made by households or economic agents to cope
with changes in temperature. Our approach allows us to get better estimates
for the intensive margin adjustment because we are explicitly controlling for
the climatic trends. For our preferred specification, our estimates yield higher
coefficients for contemporaneous temperature for the lowest two bins in com-
parison to Deschenes and Greenstone (2011), who use a similar specification but
do not control for climatic trends. Also, as we see in the results section, there
are significant differences in the coefficients of the contemporaneous tempera-
ture when one controls for the climate trend in comparison to the case where
one does not control for it. This clearly shows that it is important to control for
the climatic trends and that would give us better estimates of change in resi-
dential energy consumption due to change in weather (shock to climate trends)
and also allow us to look at adjustments in the extensive margin by looking at
the difference between the coefficients of the moving average (climate trends)
and corresponding coefficient of contemporaneous temperature bin. We also
document a non-linear relationship between temperature changes and residen-
tial energy consumption. The various climate models predict that by the end
of the century, due to global warming, we will have higher number of days in
the higher temperature bins and lower number of days in the lower tempera-
ture bins. If one uses our estimates in calculating the monetary costs of climate
change, then given that our estimates for the lower temperature bins are greater
than Deschenes and Greenstone (2011), one would possibly find a lower mone-
tary cost than their estimates.
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We also use 10 years moving average instead of 5 years to see how the esti-
mated impact changes with different notions of climate. We find that the effect
on residential energy consumption due to a change in weather does not change
in comparison to the case when we used 5 years moving average as a measure
of climate. On the adjustment in the extensive margin we find significant im-
pact for the bin with temperatures between 10 − 20◦F and as expected, because
of a bigger climate trend we find a bigger adjustment in the extensive margin.
We also find significant impacts for multiple climatic regions for both the
lower and the second highest bin. There is also significant variation in impacts
across climatic regions which suggests that results based on some region might
not be extendable to other regions. We should also note that since we are using
state year level data, the regressions involving different climatic regions lose
number of observations and also lose variation in data in the highest bin.
Lastly, we look at the possibility of extreme temperatures affecting extensive
margin adjustment. Instead of using bins of average temperatures, we construct
bins of maximum and minimum temperatures and run separate regressions for
the maximum temperature and minimum temperature bins. We have some pre-
liminary evidence which suggests that extreme temperatures do affect residen-
tial energy consumption in the extensive margin. This suggests that households
not only react to average temperatures but more extreme temperature realiza-
tions in the past might induce households to form an idea of the future average
temperatures, which will in turn affect their extensive margin adjustments.
Overall, this paper helps to address an important issue in the literature.
The reduced form estimates with contemporaneous temperature as an explana-
tory variable is not able to isolate extensive margin adjustments from intensive
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margin adjustments. Our methodology contributes to the literature in filling
the void by getting at exact estimates for responses to changes in weather and
changes due to extensive margin adjustment.
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CHAPTER 2
EFFECT OF RISING INCOME INEQUALITY ON THE EQUILIBRIUM OF
A CITY
2.1 Introduction
Rising economic inequality has been a major concern of policy makers since
several countries around the globe are experiencing a rise in wealth as well as
income inequality. The key concern is whether the rising differences affect dif-
ferent sections of the society disproportionately because of differences in the
level of vulnerability between the rich and the poor. One of the key areas is
the housing market, and the common understanding is that since land is scarce,
economic inequality would lead to the situation where the rich would outbid
the poor even more than before and therefore reduce the welfare of the poor.
One major issue in the developing countries is the large section of squatter
population or informal settlements in the cities. IPCC report 2014 clearly states
the magnitude of the problem as there has been a rapid increase in the number
of new cities recently. Poor people move to the cities for better employment
opportunities but have to live in very small poorly constructed houses. One
might think that the papers in the literature which try to capture homelessness
etc. captures informal settlements in the sense that they are also poor, but I
believe there is something more to the problem of informal settlements than the
fact they are also poor.
As the connotation informal settlements suggests that there are basic differ-
ences in the nature of their housing. Although there are several differences in
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the way we understand and treat informality, one way to understand informal-
ity is that informal housing does not come under the housing regulations and
hence are of extremely bad quality and lack all basic amenities. Also, in many
cities in India, informal settlements grow on free government land or unclaimed
lands, so sometimes there is no direct competition over a piece of land between
the rich and the poor. Many of the papers in the literature assume that both rich
and poor are competing in the same market and that may be true in developed
countries where people cannot live illegally but that is not the case in develop-
ing or underdeveloped countries because poor people do live illegally in very
bad conditions.
The governments in various countries has tried out and continue to formu-
late policies aimed at decreasing slum population. Moreover, it is not even clear
about which slum redevelopment policy works because it keeps on changing
both with changes in government and within the regime of a government. It
is well documented that people move to cities hoping for better opportunities
but the number of people migrating is too large compared to how much the city
can accommodate. Therefore poor people are forced to live in the slums. Even
if government policies aimed at reducing slum population has some positive
effect, the problem intensifies because the number of cities is growing at a rapid
rate over the years and the IPCC projections of number of cities are also alarm-
ing. Figure 2.1 and 2.2 shows number of cities in 1950 and projection for 2025
and the difference is huge.
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Figure 2.1: Cities in 1950: Source IPCC Report 2014
Figure 2.2: Projected Cities in 2025: Source IPCC Report 2014
According to UN-HABITAT, around 33% of the urban population in the de-
veloping world in 2012, or about 863 million people, lived in slums. Census
data projections show that India’s slum population will surge to 104 million by
2017 - or around 9% of the total projected national population of 1.28 billion that
year. Census data also shows how a large section of the urban population lives
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in slums in the four metropolitan cities as high as 41.3% in Greater Mumbai,
29.6% in Kolkata, 28% in Chennai and about 15% in Delhi.
So I think, the rapid growth of cities, along with the rise in income inequality,
has the potential to create a big problem in the developing countries and it is
important to understand how the rise in income inequality affects the housing
market equilibrium in the presence of slum population. Policies aimed at just
reducing slum population might not work if it is the case that all the benefits of
the policy are outdone by the changes in income inequality.
Therefore, I think it is important to understand that the presence of informal
settlements is a slightly different problem than just having a poor population in
the city. With rising income inequality, the demand for land from the rich might
go up which can potentially lead to an increase in the price of existing houses
and also a push for housing developers to build new houses. This would, in
turn, lead to less land for the informal settlers and they would be forced to relo-
cate to other places or live at even smaller houses. Another possible effect might
be the poor who previously chose to live in formal housing, might relocate to
slums if the price of housing in the formal sector goes up. So, in this paper, I
want to set-up a theoretical framework, through which we can potentially ex-
plain and understand the above mentioned issues in a more structured way.
2.2 Literature Review
There are both theoretical and empirical studies which have looked at the issue
of income inequality and its effects on housing markets. Mattanen and Tervio
(2014) considers an assignment model where households vary by incomes and
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houses by the quality and shows that the impact of increased income inequality
on house prices depends on the shapes of the distributions. Moreover, they find
that during 1998-2007, higher income inequality led to lower average housing
price in major metropolitan areas in USA. Matlack and Vigdor (2006) looks at
metropolitan areas in USA from 1970-2000 and they find that when vacancies
are low, increase in income of the rich lead to higher rents per room. Landvoigt,
Piazzesi and Schneider (2015) show that in San Diego county, the major cause
of a boom in housing prices in the 2000’s was because of cheap credit available
to the poor.
Another class of models widely used in the urban literature is the mono-
centric city models which were developed in the 1960’s and 1970’s (see Alonso
(1964), Mills (1967) and Muth (1969)) but the main features of these models are
the central business districts where people come to work and therefore living
further away from the centre is costly because of the presence of construction
costs. Another class of models introduced by Brueckner and Selod (2009), where
they explicitly model formal and informal residents and look at the effects of
formalization policies on the welfare of the rich and poor.
There have been work on homelessness in USA as well. Quigley, Raphael,
and Smolensky (2001) show that variation in homelessness in US metropolitan
cities can be explained to a large extent by increased demand for low quality
housing and prices of housing. In another study by Mansur, Quigley, Raphael,
and Smolensky (2002) show well known housing subsidy policies can help in
eliminating homelessness in USA.
Glazer etal. (2008) tries to understand how income redistribution can lead to
migration of people across counties and how it changes property values of the
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counties. Nieuwerburgh and Weill (2010) builds a general equilibrium model to
explain why for a period of 30 years there has been an increase in the price of
housing and also an increase in the variance of housing prices in US metropoli-
tan areas. Gyourko etal. (2013) shows that variation and appreciation of hous-
ing prices in US metropolitan areas is a result of inelastic land supply and in-
crease in rich households at the national level.
2.3 Model
We consider a simple model taken from Brueckner and Selod (2009) and then
extend it later on to incorporate other things we need in this paper. Even in
the basic model, we extend Brueckner’s set-up of two income groups to three
because that allows us to talk about the increase in income inequality between
different groups and lets us see the effect of it not only on the two groups in-
volved but on the other group as well. Let the size of land be denoted by L¯ and
the total land is divided into two parts Ls and L f , where Ls and L f denote the
land occupied by the squatter population and land occupied by formal residents
respectively. The population size is denoted by N and is divided into three parts
Ns,N f1 and N f2 such that
Ns + N f1 + N f2 = N
where Ns is the number of individuals living in the informal or squatter land
and N f1 and N f2 are the number of individuals living in the formal part of the
land. It is important here to distinguish between formal and informal land. In
the formal land the residents have to pay rent and in the informal land residents
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do not pay rent but have to pay an amount to the squatter organizer. N f1 and N f2
distinguishes two groups of formal residents with different income levels.
Each individual has some income which is exogenous to our model. The
squatter population has income I3, N f1 individuals have income I1 and N f2 indi-
viduals have income I2 such that
I1 > I2 > I3
Individuals consume two goods, housing (q) and non-housing good (x) and
have the following utility function
x1−αqα
There is cost of eviction which is given by
e(A,Ns, k) = ANsk
where A denotes the payment each squatter households makes to the slum or-
ganizer and k captures the political difficulties of eviction, with both k and A
being positive.
The number of people willing to stay in the formal sector is fixed and hence
denoted by N¯ f1 and N¯ f2 . Let p f denote the price or rent of housing in the for-
mal sector. Therefore the total demand for housing in the formal sector is the
following
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d f (p f ) = N¯ f1[
αI1
p f
] + N¯ f2[
αI2
p f
]
The squatter organizer is assumed to of benevolent nature and hence tries
to maximize the utility of the informal residents. The organizer takes into ac-
count the demand for land by the formal residents and assures no eviction in
the equilibrium. The squatter population budget constraint is
A + x = I3
where the price of the non-housing good has been normalized to 1 and therefore
the problem faced by the organizer is as follows
max {A,qs,Ns}(I3 − A)1−αqαs
subject to Ls + L f = L¯
Nsqs = Ls
N¯ f1[
αI1
p f
] + N¯ f2[
αI2
p f
] = L f
ANsk ≥ p f
The last constraint will hold with equality in equilibrium. Moreover, using
this to replace p f in the third constraint and then solving for Ls from the first
constraint we can use the second constraint to compute qs. Therefore the prob-
lem can be rewritten as (planner chooses Ns and A)
max (I3 − A)1−α( L¯ − β/ANsNs )
α (2.1)
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where β = (N¯ f1αI1+N¯ f2αI2)k .
Solving the problem would yield the following solution
p∗f =
2α(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)
L¯
A∗ = αI3
q∗s =
kI3L¯2
4(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)
N∗s =
2(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)
kI3L¯
L∗s = L
∗
f = L¯/2
Moreover, for this equilibrium to be sustained the parameters of the model
should be such that the indirect utility of a squatter household from moving
into the formal residential area should be less than the indirect utility received
when living on the informal land. This condition implies
[(1 − α)y3]1−α[αy3/p∗f ]α < [
(y3 − A)1−αky3L¯2
4(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)
]α
which implies kL¯ > 2.
2.3.1 Effects of Rising Income Inequality
In this section, we want to discuss how the housing market equilibrium is af-
fected by changes in income inequality in two ways. First, we will ask what
happens if income inequality widens between residents in the formal sector
only. Second, we will ask what happens if income inequality widens between
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residents in the formal and the informal sector. We characterize widening of
income inequality by looking at the ratios of income of two different income
groups.
Case 1: Suppose I1/I2 increases, that is rich people in the formal sector be-
come richer and also we consider and mean preserving redistribution, which
implies
(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2) + 2(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)/kL¯
N¯ f1 + N¯ f2 + 2(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)/kI3L¯
does not change. Therefore, note that I1 increases and I2 decreases but since
this is a mean preserving redistribution N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2 does not change. Also note
that our results in the previous section depend on N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2. So, the optimal
values of the variables mentioned in the previous section do not change at all,
which implies that indirect utility of the informal residents does not change at
all. In the formal sector, the price of the two goods has not changed but income
has changed, so we can say that the rich in the formal sector are better-off and
the poor in the formal sector are worse-off because of the widening gap.
Case 2: Now, let us consider the case where either I1/I3 increases or I2/I3 in-
creases. The analysis would yield similar results for both of them, so let us just
consider the case where I1/I3 and the change is such that the mean income re-
mains the same. Again, if we look at the optimal values in the previous section,
we see that p∗f increases, q
∗
s decreases and N∗s increases. Therefore, due to rise in
the price of housing in the formal sector, the middle class residing in the formal
sector are affected negatively although their income remains same. The indirect
utility of the informal residents is
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Vs = [(1 − α)I3]1−α[ kI3L¯
2
4(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)
]α
Hence the poor in the informal sector are also affected negatively due to
lower income and lower consumption of the non-housing good.
The indirect utility of the rich is
V1 = [(1 − α)I1]1−α[ L¯I12(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)
]α
Note that although the rich have higher income, they also face higher hous-
ing prices but despite that their utility will increase (shown in section 4.2).
The above observations can be summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1 a) Increase (decrease) in income inequality in the formal sector does
not affect the squatter population, however, it negatively (positively) affects the middle
income group.
b) Increase (decrease) in income inequality between the formal sector rich and squat-
ter population negatively (positively) affects the squatter population and the middle
income group, positively (negatively) affects the rich and size of squatter population
increases (decreases).
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2.4 Extention of the Model
In this section, we would like to extend the model by bringing in the govern-
ment which taxes price of housing in the formal sector and the proceeds from
the tax are used to supply public goods to the squatter population. Let t denote
the tax of housing price in the formal market. Also, let H denote the level of
public facilities available in the squatter land and this enters the utility function
of the squatter household in the following way
Us = Hx1−αqα
The new budget constraint of the formal residents is
(1 + t)p fq f + x = Ii for i = 1, 2.
Therefore the demand for housing from the formal sector is
d f (p f ) = N¯ f1
αI1
(1 + t)p f
+ N¯ f2
αI2
(1 + t)p f
.
Tax revenues of the government is
T (t) = t[N¯ f1
αI1
(1 + t)
+ N¯ f2
αI2
(1 + t)
]
Note that the tax revenue does not depend of the price of housing in the formal
sector.
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Let H(T (t)) denote the function which transforms tax revenues to public util-
ities. The squatter organizer while solving the problem takes H in the utility
function to be exogenously given. Therefore his problem becomes
max {A,qs,Ns}H(I3 − A)1−αqαs
subject to Ls + L f = L¯
Nsqs = Ls
N¯ f1
αI1
(1 + t)p f
+ N¯ f2
αI2
(1 + t)p f
= L f
ANsk ≥ p f
Solving the problem similarly we get
p∗f =
2α(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)
L¯(1 + t)
A∗ = αI3
q∗s =
kI3L¯2(1 + t)
4(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)
N∗s =
2(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)
kI3L¯(1 + t)
L∗s = L
∗
f = L¯/2
2.4.1 Effects of Increase in Income Inequality
The analysis in the section will be similar to the analysis in section 3. We want
to see how the different groups of people are affected by the increase in income
inequality. We will divide our analysis into two cases. Case 1 will discuss the
scenario where income inequality rises between the rich and the middle income
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group and case 2 will discuss the scenario where income inequality increases
between the rich and the poor.
Case 1: Suppose I1 increases and I2 decreases and also suppose this is a mean
preserving spread which again implies as in section 3 that
(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2) + 2(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)/kL¯
N¯ f1 + N¯ f2 + 2(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)/kI3L¯
does not change. Therefore, as before, note that I1 increases and I2 decreases but
since this is a mean preserving redistribution N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2 does not change. Also
note that our results in the previous section depend on N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2. So, we can
conclude that in the presence of a proportional tax t, rise in income inequality
affects the rich and the middle income group, but has no affect of the infor-
mal settlements, since the total income in the hands of the formal residents has
not changed. However, it should be noted that rarely, we have a tax structure
which imposes the same tax t for all income levels. If we have a progressive tax
structure in place, then in equilibrium, the poor would benefit from an increase
in income inequality in the formal sector (if we assume that the function H is
increasing).
Case 2: Suppose I1 increases and I3 decreases, and again we are consider-
ing a mean preserving spread. We can consider the other situation where I2
increases, I3 decreases and I1 does not change but the analysis will be similar
in both cases and so we will concentrate on the former case. One can observe
from the solution obtained in section 4, that p∗f goes up, q
∗
s goes down and N∗s
goes up. Therefore the indirect utility of the middle income group goes down
for sure although their income did not change. The indirect utility of the rich in
the presence of tax is
V1 = [(1 − α)I1]1−α[ L¯I12(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)
]α
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and one can show that this function is increasing in I1.
The indirect utility of the poor is
Vs = H(t[N¯ f1
αI1
(1 + t)
+ N¯ f2
αI2
(1 + t)
])[(1 − α)I3]1−α[ kI3L¯
2(1 + t)
4(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)
]α
Now, we would like to compare the indirect utility of the poor before and after
increase in inequality. Suppose to start with the income of the groups were
(I¯1, I¯3) and after the change in income, taking care of the fact that it is a mean
preserving spread, let them be (βI¯1, δI¯3), such that β > 1 and 0 < δ < 1. Let V¯s
denote the indirect utility after the change in income inequality. The indirect
utility becomes
V¯s = H(t[N¯ f1
αβI1
(1 + t)
+ N¯ f2
αI2
(1 + t)
])[(1 − α)δI3]1−α[ kδI3L¯
2(1 + t)
4(N¯ f1βI1 + N¯ f2 I2)
]α
Therefore, we can say that the squatter population is worse off due to an in-
crease in inequality if and only if
H(t[N¯ f1
αI1
(1 + t)
+ N¯ f2
αI2
(1 + t)
]) ≥ H(t[N¯ f1
αβI1
(1 + t)
+ N¯ f2
αI2
(1 + t)
])δ(
(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)
(N¯ f1βI1 + N¯ f2 I2)
)α
Note that the tax revenue has gone up due to the increase in inequality but
the poor also has less income compared to before. So it is not clear whether
the increase in income inequality between the rich and the poor makes the poor
worse off or not. Note that if the population of poor relative to the rich is very
high then β would be much larger than δ which would increase the probability
that the poor are better off after the increase in income inequality.
Proposition 2.2 In the presence of government provision of public goods
a) Increase (decrease) in income inequality in the formal sector does not affect the
squatter population, however, it negatively (positively) affects the middle income group.
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b) Increase (decrease) in income inequality between the formal sector rich and squat-
ter population negatively (positively) affects the middle income group, positively (nega-
tively) affects the rich and the effect on a squatter household is ambiguous.
This is an important result because it shows that the notion that the poor are
always negatively affected due to increase in income inequality might not be
true. It depends on the function H and the population size of each group. Note
that even if we are in a win-win situation for both rich and the poor, the middle
income group suffers unambiguously.
In the following section, we want to see that if we are in a situation where
the poor are indeed affected negatively due to a rise in income inequality, then
is it possible for the government to increase the tax rate t on formal housing and
make the poor better off.
2.4.2 Increase in Tax
In this section, we want to see if rising the tax on formal housing can offset
the negative impact of rising income inequality. Let us assume that after the
rise in income inequality between the rich and the poor the tax rate t has been
increased from t to t′. Therefore as derived in the previous section the squatter
population is better off after tax cum inequality change if and only if
V¯s = H(t′[N¯ f1
αβI1
(1 + t′)
+ N¯ f2
αI2
(1 + t′)
])[(1 − α)δI3]1−α[ kδI3L¯
2(1 + t′)
4(N¯ f1βI1 + N¯ f2 I2)
]α
≥ H(t[N¯ f1
αI1
(1 + t)
+ N¯ f2
αI2
(1 + t)
])[(1 − α)I3]1−α[ kI3L¯
2(1 + t)
4(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)
]α
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which simplifying to
V¯s = H(t′[N¯ f1
αβI1
(1 + t′)
+ N¯ f2
αI2
(1 + t′)
])δ(
1 + t′
1 + t
)α(
(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)
(N¯ f1βI1 + N¯ f2 I2)
)α
≥ H(t[N¯ f1
αI1
(1 + t)
+ N¯ f2
αI2
(1 + t)
])
Note that δ( (N¯ f1 I1+N¯ f2 I2)(N¯ f1βI1+N¯ f2 I2)
)α < 1 so a necessary condition for the poor to be better off
is
H(t′[N¯ f1
αβI1
(1 + t′)
+ N¯ f2
αI2
(1 + t′)
])(
1 + t′
1 + t
)α ≥ H(t[N¯ f1
αI1
(1 + t)
+ N¯ f2
αI2
(1 + t)
])
which clearly holds. The objective of doing this is to show that by increasing
the tax rate there is a scope for the government to assure that the welfare of a
poor household is not negatively affected.
Proposition 2.3 In the presence of government provision of public goods, higher
tax on housing in the formal sector can offset the negative impacts of rising income in-
equality on the poor households.
For a linear function of H(.) one can calculate the exact value of t′ and that has
been done in the appendix. Note that we can further analyze the effect of this
on the welfare of the other two income groups. Suppose after the increase in
income inequality, the tax rate has been increased from t to t′ and also assume,
for the sake of simplicity that the function H(.) is linear. We know that at the
tax rate t′ the poor are just as well off as they were before the rise of income
inequality. One can show that the indirect utility of the rich and the middle in-
come group does not change with the introduction of the tax because the price
adjusts when the tax rate is increased. The owner of the land who get the rents
(p f ) are negatively affected by the increase in tax.
67
If we divert our attention to the other variables of interest, then there are
some interesting things happening as well. Note that when the tax was t, qs and
Ns were
q∗s =
kδI3L¯2(1 + t)
4(N¯ f1βI1 + N¯ f2 I2)
N∗s =
2(N¯ f1βI1 + N¯ f2 I2)
kδI3L¯(1 + t)
After the increase in taxes from t to t′ qs and Ns were
q∗s =
kδI3L¯2(1 + t′)
4(N¯ f1βI1 + N¯ f2 I2)
N∗s =
2(N¯ f1βI1 + N¯ f2 I2)
kδI3L¯(1 + t′)
So note that although the higher tax rate t′ ensured that an individual squat-
ter household is as least as good as before the change in income inequality, we
see that the number of squatter households that the city can accommodate de-
creases, which implies that the cost of bringing this change is quite high. This
can be summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.4 In the presence of government provision of public goods, higher tax
lead to higher consumption of housing by the poor but the number of poor people the
city can accommodate decreases.
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2.5 Movement of Households Between Sectors
In this section, we want to modify the model by allowing for many income
levels in the model. So far, we had three groups of individuals, the rich, the
middle-income ones and the poor. The population size of the rich and the poor
was exogenously fixed and the population size of the squatter population was
endogenously determined in the model. We want to see if there are movements
of households from the formal to the informal sector due to rise in income in-
equality. Therefore, one would think that a model with continuous levels of
income of households would be ideal for the analysis and we can get a thresh-
old value of income which determines whether a household chooses to live in
the formal sector or the informal sector. If we see that the threshold of income
changes with change in income inequality, then we can claim that income in-
equality not only affects the well-being of each group but also affects the size
of the informal sector. Note that we have already shown that the size of the in-
formal sector is indeed affected by the rise of income inequality in the previous
section but that was due to the choice the squatter organizer made whether to
allow more or less poor in the informal sector. There was no movement between
the informal and the formal sector and that is precisely the channel we want to
explore in this section.
This can be explored within the frameworks of our existing basic set-up. We
will move to the continuous framework later on and before getting to the con-
tinuous frameworks let us see what happens if I2 and I3 are close to each other.
In the previous sections, we did not bother to consider whether the middle in-
come groups would choose to live in the slums or not because the underlying
assumption was that incomes of middle income group were sufficiently high
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to avoid movement of the middle income group to the slums. We derived a
condition which ensures that the households in the informal sector would not
choose to move to the formal sector. The proposition in the previous section
showed that when income inequality increased between the poor and the rich
the middle income group was negatively affected. In what follows we will see
under what conditions would the middle income group be willing to move to
the informal sector.
The analysis can be divided into two parts. First, we will look at the effects
of rising income inequality between the rich and the middle income group and
then we will move on to the effects of rising income inequality between rich and
poor.
Case 1: Suppose income inequality increases between the rich and the mid-
dle income group. At income level I2 the indirect utility of the middle income
group was
Vm = [(1 − α)I2]1−α[ L¯I22(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)
]α
Suppose the income of the rich goes up from I1 to θI1 and that of the middle
income group goes down from I2 to µI3 such that θ > 1 and µ < 1. Note that for
this to be a mean preserving spread the following condition should hold
N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2 = N¯ f1θI1 + N¯ f2µI2
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The indirect utility of the middle income group now becomes
V ′m = [(1 − α)µI2]1−α[
L¯µI2
2(N¯ f1θI1 + N¯ f2µI2)
]α
= [(1 − α)µI2]1−α[ L¯µI22(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)
]α
Clearly utility of the middle income group goes down. If, for the sake of sim-
plicity, we assume that all slum dwellers have to pay the same for defensive
activities, and gets the same amount of housing, then middle income group
would want to reside in the informal area if and only if
H(t[N¯ f1
αθI1
(1 + t)
+ N¯ f2
αµI2
(1 + t)
])[µI2 − αI3]1−α[ kI3L¯
2(1 + t)
4(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)
]α
≥ [(1 − α)µI2]1−α[ L¯µI22(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)
]α,
which implies
H(t[N¯ f1
αθI1
(1 + t)
+ N¯ f2
αµI2
(1 + t)
])[µI2 − αI3]1−α[kI3L¯(1 + t)/2]α
≥ [(1 − α)I2]1−αµIα2
Therefore we see that rise in income inequality can potentially cause move-
ments of households from the formal to the informal sector. Note that till now
we have not solved for the equilibrium of any sort in this case and we will do
that later but even without solving one can see that there are incentives for the
middle income group to move to the slums.
Case 2: Suppose the income inequality rises between the rich and the poor
and the middle income group’s income remains the same. As we did previously,
let θ denote the rise in income of the rich and β denote the fall in income of
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the poor and θ and β are such that the redistribution is mean preserving. The
indirect utility of the middle income become rise in income inequality was
Vm = [(1 − α)I2]1−α[ L¯I22(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)
]α.
After the rise in income inequality the indirect utility of the middle income
household is
V ′m = [(1 − α)I2]1−α[
L¯I2
2(N¯ f1θI1 + N¯ f2 I2)
]α.
Therefore note that again there is a drop in the utility of the middle income
group due to rise in income inequality. The middle income group would like to
move to the informal sector if and only if
H(t[N¯ f1
αθI1
(1 + t)
+ N¯ f2
αI2
(1 + t)
])[I2 − αI3]1−α[ kβI3L¯
2(1 + t)
4(N¯ f1θI1 + N¯ f2 I2)
]α
≥ [(1 − α)I2]1−α[ L¯I22(N¯ f1θI1 + N¯ f2 I2)
]α,
As we had seen in the previous case, the rise in income inequality might induce
middle income group to move into the informal sector. Also, note that we can
compare the two cases to see which situation makes the middle income group
relatively worse. The middle income group becomes worse in the situation of
case 1 than case 2 if and only if
[(1 − α)µI2]1−α[ L¯µI22(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)
]α ≤ [(1 − α)I2]1−α[ L¯I22(N¯ f1θI1 + N¯ f2 I2)
]α
µ ≤ N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2
N¯ f1θI1 + N¯ f2 I2
.
So note that it is not clear whether the middle income households are worse off
when their income decreases versus when the poor become poorer. These ob-
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servations are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.5 a) Rise in income inequality between rich and middle income and
between rich and poor can result in movement of middle income households from formal
sector to the informal sector.
b) Also under certain conditions rise in income inequality between rich and poor can
make middle income households in the formal sector worse than if there own income had
gone down.
Note that in the previous analysis we have considered cases where income in-
equality only rises but one can also so a similar analysis for analyzing situations
when income inequality falls. Suppose income inequality decreases between
the rich and the middle income groups. It is easy to see that if it is a mean-
preserving spread, then that would not affect the poor. But instead, suppose
we are in a situation where rich and middle income live in the formal sector
and middle income and poor live in the informal sector. Then fall in income in-
equality can potentially induce the middle income households in the informal
sector to move back to the formal sector. The motive of this discussion is to point
out that changes in income inequality between different groups of households
change the equilibrium of the city significantly. The problem of growing slum
population can be significantly intensified by rising income inequality. There-
fore it is necessary for the policy makers to consider the sources of growing slum
population and also address them.
Till now we have tried to lay down conditions under which people would
want to move across sectors and our focus has been the middle income group.
We have shown that movement of middle income groups from formal to infor-
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mal sector is possible in both situations- when income inequality rises between
rich and poor or when income inequality rises between rich and middle income
groups. Now we will try to formulate the problem differently and find the equi-
librium under the assumption that there is an incentive for the middle income
group to move. The difficult part of this problem is to model the squatter orga-
nizer’s problem and one can take different directions in terms of modeling. One
way of doing it is suppose the squatter organizer maximizes the sum of utilities
of the poor and the middle income group who wants to stay in the informal
sector. Then the squatter organizer would maximize
H[N′f2(µI2 − A2)1−αqαsm + Ns(I3 − A3)1−αqαsp]
where N′f2 denotes the number of middle income households in the informal sec-
tor, qsm and qsp denote the housing consumption by the middle income house-
hold and the poor household in the informal sector and A2 aand A3 denote
the contribution for prevention of eviction in the squatter land. The organiser
would choose A2, A3,Ns, qsm and qsp. The constraints faced by the organiser is as
follows
Ls + L f = L¯
Nsqsp + N′f2qsm = Ls
N¯ f1
αθI1
(1 + t)p f
+ (N¯ f2 − N′f2)
αµI2
(1 + t)p f
= L f
k[A3Ns + A2N′f2] ≥ p f
(µI2 − A2)1−αqαsm = [(1 − α)I2]1−α[
L¯µI2
2(N¯ f1θI1 + (N¯ f2 − N′f2)µI2)
]α.
Note that we are considering the situation under which income inequality has
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gone up between the rich and the middle income housholds and the last con-
straint ensures that at the equilibrium no more middle income group houshold
finds it beneficial to move from the formal to the informal sector. If instead we
were in the situation where income inequality had increased between the rich
and the poor then the squatter organiser’s problem would have been as follows.
maxH[N′f2(I2 − A2)1−αqαsm + Ns(βI3 − A3)1−αqαsp]
subject to
Ls + L f = L¯
Nsqsp + N′f2qsm = Ls
N¯ f1
αθI1
(1 + t)p f
+ (N¯ f2 − N′f2)
αI2
(1 + t)p f
= L f
k[A3Ns + A2N′f2] ≥ p f
(I2 − A2)1−αqαsm = [(1 − α)I2]1−α[
L¯I2
2(N¯ f1θI1 + (N¯ f2 − N′f2)I2)
]α.
Alternatively, one can choose to model in the following way where the squat-
ter organizer cares only about the poor population living in the informal sector
and everybody living in the informal sector gets the same amount of housing
and pays the same A irrespective of their income. Therefore the problem faced
by the squatter organizer is as follows
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max(I3 − A)1−αqαs ]
subject to
Ls + L f = L¯
(Ns + N′f2)qs = Ls
N¯ f1
αθI1
(1 + t)p f
+ (N¯ f2 − N′f2)
αµI2
(1 + t)p f
= L f
k[A(Ns + N′f2)] ≥ p f
(µI2 − A)1−αqαs = [(1 − α)µI2]1−α[
L¯µI2
2(N¯ f1θI1 + (N¯ f2 − N′f2)µI2)
]α.
This is the case where income inequality increased between the rich and the
middle income hosuholds. The organiser chooses Ns, A and qs. In a similar
manner one can formulate the problem of the organiser when income inequality
rises between rich and poor.
max(βI3 − A)1−αqαs ]
subject to
Ls + L f = L¯
(Ns + N′f2)qs = Ls
N¯ f1
αθI1
(1 + t)p f
+ (N¯ f2 − N′f2)
αI2
(1 + t)p f
= L f
k[A(Ns + N′f2)] ≥ p f
(I2 − A)1−αqαs = [(1 − α)I2]1−α[
L¯µI2
2(N¯ f1θI1 + (N¯ f2 − N′f2)I2)
]α.
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2.5.1 Movement of Poor From Informal to Formal Land
It is often discussed in the policy circle that despite inequality rising in the econ-
omy, poverty has decreased a lot. The following figure shows the decrease in
poverty levels in both rural and urban India.
Figure 2.3:
Therefore if it is the case that poverty is going down and income inequality is
going up, then one can analyse the situation where everyone has more income
but the rate as which the rich are becoming righer is greater than the rate as
which the income of the poor are increasing. For the sake of simplicity, we will
assume that a N¯s number of people who had a income of I3 now have an income
I2. Note that it is not necessary to assume that they move to the middle income
group, we can choose some other income below I2 as well but that unnecessar-
ily complicates the problem with adding much. Also we will asume that I2 is
sufficiently high so that the middle income group does not want to stay in the
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informal sector. Let us define the rate of increase of income of the N¯s poor as
I2 − I3 = k. Therefore going by our story I1 has to increase to something more
than I1 + k, and let it be denoted by I′1. Therefore we can rewrite the planner’s
problem as follows
max {A,qs,Ns}H(I3 − A)1−αqαs
subject to Ls + L f = L¯
Nsqs = Ls
N¯ f1
α(I1 + k)
(1 + t)p f
+ (N¯ f2 + N¯s)
αI2
(1 + t)p f
= L f
ANsk ≥ p f
Solving the problem similarly we get
p∗f =
2α(N¯ f1(I1 + k) + (N¯ f2 + N¯s)I2)
L¯(1 + t)
A∗ = αI3
q∗s =
kI3L¯2(1 + t)
4(N¯ f1(I1 + k) + (N¯ f2 + N¯s)I2)
N∗s =
2(N¯ f1(I1 + k) + (N¯ f2 + N¯s)I2)
kI3L¯(1 + t)
L∗s = L
∗
f = L¯/2
The results show that the price of housing in the formal sector has gone up
due to higher demand in the formal sector, the number of people the staying
in the informal sector has gone up but their consumption of housing has gone
down. So we see that as a result of some poor population becoming richer and
increasing the size of the middle income group, there is a rise in the number of
slum dwellers. This result is interesting because one would think that higher
income of the poor would help them to have better housing and hence would
stop the growth in the informal settlement but the constant migration of poor
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from rural to urban sector does not allow stop the growth of informal settle-
ments, in fact, the opposite happens. Also, a result of the growth in the size of
the middle income group, the utility of each household in the middle income
group also decreases, due to rise in the price of land in the formal sector. It can
be seen easily from the indirect utility of the middle income group.
V2 = [(1 − α)I2]1−α[ L¯I22(N¯ f1(I1 + k) + (N¯ f2 + N¯s)I2)
]α.
Tax collected after the change in incomes is as follows
T (t) = t[N¯ f1
α(I1 + k)
(1 + t)
+ (N¯ f2 + N¯s)
αI2
(1 + t)
],
which shows that tax collected has increased because of higher income of rich
and more number of middle income households. This implies that it is ambigu-
ous whether poor living in the informal land are better off or worse off after the
change in inequality. All the above observations is summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2.6 If income increases for both rich and poor and income inequality
rise, then the rich are better off, the original middle income group are worse off, the effect
on informal settlers is ambiguous but the number of informal settlers increases.
2.6 Effects of Expansion of City Limits
By expansion of city limits, we mean an increase in L¯. It is commonly observed
that big cities in developing countries are always expanding. One potential
reason might be that the government is building roads, or expanding transport
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facilities which allow individuals to reside in those places thus increasing the
size of the city. Simple partial derivatives of the optimal values obtained in
section 5 show that expansion of city limit will result in a lower price of housing
in the formal sector, non-linear increase in housing consumption of the squatter
population and decrease in size of the squatter population. Both the rich and
the middle income group are unambiguously better off and the utility of the
poor after the increase in land size from barL to L˜ is
Vs = H(t[N¯ f1
αI1
(1 + t)
+ N¯ f2
αI2
(1 + t)
])[(1 − α)I3]α[ kI3L˜
2(1 + t)
4(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)
]α.
Note that the utility of the poor also goes up unambiguously. This also sug-
gests that if a city is expanding then it is possible for the city counter the neg-
ative impacts of rising income inequality through the expansion of land size.
Note that if there is rising income inequality and rise in land size simultane-
ously then the utility of the poor will be
V¯s = H(t[N¯ f1
αβI1
(1 + t)
+ N¯ f2
αI2
(1 + t)
])[(1 − α)δI3]1−α[ kδI3L˜
2(1 + t)
4(N¯ f1βI1 + N¯ f2 I2)
]α.
Therefore the condition which has to hold for the poor to be not worse off
after the rise in inequality and land size is
H(t[N¯ f1
αβI1
(1 + t)
+ N¯ f2
αI2
(1 + t)
])[(1 − α)δI3]1−α[ kδI3L˜
2(1 + t)
4(N¯ f1βI1 + N¯ f2 I2)
]α
≥ H(t[N¯ f1
αI1
(1 + t)
+ N¯ f2
αI2
(1 + t)
])[(1 − α)I3]α[ kI3L¯
2(1 + t)
4(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)
]α.
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2.6.1 A Linear H Function
Suppose we have a linear H function which takes the following form
H = a + bk; a, b > 0.
Then the condition for the poor not to be worse off is
[a + b(t[N¯ f1
αβI1
(1 + t)
+ N¯ f2
αI2
(1 + t)
])][(1 − α)δI3]1−α[ kδI3L˜
2(1 + t)
4(N¯ f1βI1 + N¯ f2 I2)
]α
≥ [a + b(t[N¯ f1
αI1
(1 + t)
+ N¯ f2
αI2
(1 + t)
])][(1 − α)I3]α[ kI3L¯
2(1 + t)
4(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)
]α
=⇒ [a + b(t[N¯ f1
αβI1
(1 + t)
+ N¯ f2
αI2
(1 + t)
])]δ[
L˜2
N¯ f1βI1 + N¯ f2 I2
]α
≥ [a + b(t[N¯ f1
αI1
(1 + t)
+ N¯ f2
αI2
(1 + t)
])][
L¯2
N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2
]α
Proposition 2.7Under certain conditions expansion of city limit can undo the neg-
ative impact of rising income inequality between rich and poor.
These results are driven by the fact that the population in the formal sector is
fixed and since more land is available now the price of land goes down. The
consumption of housing of each squatter households grows non-linearly which
prevents other poor people entry into the squatter land.
To emphasize the fact that the assumption of fixed formal sector residents
is crucial, let us do a small exercise. Suppose land increases from L¯ to rL¯ such
that r > 1 and both groups of formal residents increase λ times such that λ > 1.
Solving the planner’s problem again one would get
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p∗f = (
λ
r
)
2α(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)
L¯(1 + t)
A∗ = αI3
q∗s = (
r2
λ
)
(1 + t)kI3L¯2
4(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)
N∗s = (
λ
r
)
2(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)
kI3L¯(1 + t)
L∗s = L
∗
f = L¯/2
Therefore, one can see that if the expansion of city limits is accompanied by
the influx of formal residents into the city, then the above mentioned observa-
tions might not hold. The results will depend on the relative increment size of
land and of the size of formal residents.
2.7 Policy Discussions
Several governments is many countries had to face or are still facing this prob-
lem of rising informal settlements and various government policies have been
tried in different countries to tackle this problem. In India, the projections of
future informal settlements are quite alarming and hence the Indian goverment
has set a new target called ”Housing for All by 2022”. Most policies, till date,
aimed at reducing informal population, can be classified into two broad cate-
gories:
i) Uprooting informal settlements completely by brute force since informal
settlers do not have any legal right on the land. Policy makers quickly realized
that this has a high social cost and hence was not used too much.
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ii) Slum redevelopment and better supply of basic ammenities. These poli-
cies aimed at helping informal households to improve their existing houses and
also provide basic ammenities like clean water and electricity. ”Housing for
All” in India is a different version of slum redevelopment process where they
also aim to have a public-private partnership in building new houses for the
informal settlers and has a target of 300 Indian cities by 2019.
Usually all these policies are long term and take many years to acheive the
goal. Every government aim to to bring the whole society into the formal hous-
ing section or in other words formalize the informal land in some way. Brueck-
ner and Selod (2009) discuss the consequences of complete formalization of the
city space and show that the rich are better off and the poor worse off. In this
section, we would discuss the consequences of partial formalization of land.
Note that any policy cannot formalize a city overnight, so formalization hap-
pens in phases. If that is the case then it would be interesting to do a small
exercise on partial formalization and its consequences.
To begin with, let the take the simplest model we cosidered in the beginning
of the paper with government and no provision of public goods. The way we
want to think about partial formalization is that the goverment chooses a plot
of land which was previously occupied by informal settlers and builds housing
and accomodates as many informal settlers as in can. Let us assume φ fraction
of available land in the city is where the formalization has taken place. So, the
city is left with (1− φ)L¯ of land area. Setting up the problem in a similar manner
to before, the squatter organizer faces the following problem:
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max {A,qs,Ns}(I3 − A)1−αqαs
subject to Ls + L f = L¯(1 − φ)
Nsqs = Ls
N¯ f1[
αI1
p f
] + N¯ f2[
αI2
p f
] = L f
ANsk ≥ p f
Rearranging equations in the problem as before, the problem can be rewrit-
ten as (planner chooses Ns and A)
max (I3 − A)1−α( L¯(1 − φ) − β/ANsNs )
α (2.2)
where β = (N¯ f1αI1+N¯ f2αI2)k .
Solving the problem would yield the following solution
p∗f =
2α(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)
L¯(1 − φ)
A∗ = αI3
q∗s =
kI3[L¯(1 − φ)]2
4(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)
N∗s =
2(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)
kI3L¯
(1 − φ)
L∗s = L
∗
f = L¯(1 − φ)/2
Proposition 2.8 Under partial formalization, all sections of the society are nega-
tively affected, the formal sector faces higher rent and the informal sector gets less units
of housing per household and the number of informal settlers increases.
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Note that because land becomes scarce, the price of land in the formal sector
goes up which negatively affects both the rich and the middle income groups.
Since pˆ f is higher now, the squatter organizer has to accomodate more people
in the informal sector to satisfy the no eviction constraint. This leads to a lower
qs and hence affects the informal settlers negatively.
We can move further and conduct an analysis to check how increasing in-
come inequality affects different sections of the society when the society in in a
state 1of partial formalization. We believe that it would be interesting and we
might see changes in magnitudes of the effect but the qualitative results would
not be affected.
This analysis on partial formalization also suggests that it is also important
to expand city limits if possible, as this would help in reducing the negative
impacts poited out in the previous proposition. We understand that expanding
cities is not so easy in a country like India where the city expansion rate is very
low. Also, since the migration rates to cities are quite high, this suggests that
government policies to aim towards vertical growth of cities. This also suggests
that redevelopment of existing informal housing might not be a good policy
instrument in the long run.
2.8 Conclusion
The rising slum population in developing countries is a potentially big problem
for most of the developing countries. The objective of this paper is to see if
there are other forces with distort the equilibrium of a city and participates in
the increase or decrease in slum population. Many countries across the globe
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are experiencing a rise in income inequality over the last few decades. So the
key question was whether rising income inequality plays a role in increasing or
decreasing slum population and how that changes the equilibrium of the city
and the welfare of nonpoor sections of the society.
In order to do that we relied on a simple theoretical set-up inspired from
Brueckner and Selod’s work. We modify the model to a large extent to allow
for the governmental provision of public goods in the informal sector and also
extend the model to allow for two groups of households residing in the for-
mal sector- the rich and the middle income group. We assume that government
taxes the housing sector in the formal sector for funding the provision of public
good and it balances the budget. The results shows some interesting features.
We see that the results crucially depend on the whether income inequality rises
between rich and middle income groups or between rich/middle income and
poor households. Our preliminary results suggest that rise in income inequal-
ity between the rich and middle income gruops does not have any effect on the
slum dwellers or the informal settlers. However, rise in income inequality be-
tween the poor and the rich affects the poor negatively and interestingly it also
affects the middle income group. Then we moved on to introduce government
provision of public good in the informal sector. Results show that as before, rise
in income inequality between rich and middle income groups does not affect
the poor as long as the average income remains the same. But when income
inequality rises between the rich and the poor it is not clear whether that hurts
the poor or not. It crucially depends on the rise in government provision of
public goods and the extent to which the poor households income goes down.
This shows that firstly if income inequality as a whole goes up or down, it is
important to find out which sections of the society suffered and gained and sec-
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ondly to note that it might not be always bad for the poor if income inequality
goes up. We went on to show that conditions under which the poor are indeed
negatively affected due to a rise in income inequality between the rich and the
poor, a higher tax on housing can reduce the negative impact of rising inequal-
ity and there exists a tax rate t which makes the poor just as well off as it was
before. Finally, we considered the issue of movement of households across sec-
tors. We show that if the income of the middle income group is sufficiently
low, then under both cases (rise in inequality between rich and poor and rise
in inequality between rich and poor) there is a possibility that middle income
group households would want to reside in the informal sector. We address a
common concern related to decrease in poverty and rise in income inequality.
Many countries have witnessed large decrease in poverty levels but huge rise
in income inequality. This is possible if both poor and rich become richer, but at
differential rates. We find that in this situation the number of poor households
in the city increases; the effect on their welfare is ambiguous but the middle
income group is worse off.
We also look at the issue of partial formalization of slums and find interest-
ing results and challenges for the policy makers. We saw that partial formal-
ization will negatively affect all sections of the society. Our analysis suggests
that with lack of city expansion, vertical expansion of cities is the only way to
accomodate huge population in cities and therefore redevelopment of existing
informal housing might not be a good instrument in the long run.
Lack of data on these issues makes us rely on theoretical models to discuss
the issue. In a simple set-up which models informal settlements explicitly, we
see that rise or fall in income inequality amplifies or reduces the rising growth
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of slum population in developing countries. Income inequality has the potential
to add fuel to the fire and therefore policy makers need to consider these issues
while discussing slum redevelopment policies.
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2.10 Appendix
2.10.1 Derivation of Solution of the Squatter Planner’s Problem
Differentiating equation (1) with respect to A and Ns yields the following respec-
tively
−(1 − α)(L¯NsA2 − βA) + α(I3 − A)β = 0 (2.3)
β
AN2s
− (L¯ − β/ANs)
Ns
= 0 (2.4)
Rearranging equation (3) yields
ANs =
2β
L¯
(2.5)
Using equation (4) in equation (2) yields A = αY3. One can also check the
second order conditions for a maximization problem and those conditions are
satisfied in this case.
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2.10.2 Derivation of Solution of the Squatter Planner’s Problem
with tax and H
The problem is
max {A,qs,Ns}H(I3 − A)1−αqαs
subject to Ls + L f = L¯
Nsqs = Ls
N¯ f1
αI1
(1 + t)p f
+ N¯ f2
αI2
(1 + t)p f
= L f
ANsk ≥ p f
which can be rewritten as
max {A,qs,Ns}H(I3 − A)1−αqαs
subject to Ls + L f = L¯
subject to Ls + L f = L¯
Nsqs = Ls
N˜ f1
αI1
p f
+ N˜ f2
αI2
p f
= L f
ANsk ≥ p f
where N˜ f1 =
N¯ f1
1+t and N˜ f2 =
N¯ f2
1+t . Also notice that the planner takes H(.) to
be exogenous and therefore that term vanishes when we take the first order
conditions. So the problem reduces to the same problem solved in section 8.1
and for getting the optimal values we can replace N¯ f1 and N¯ f2 by N˜ f1 and N˜ f2
respectively.
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2.10.3 Indirect Utility of Rich When (I1/I3) Increases
We can take the pratial derivation of V1 with respect to I1 and check if it is posi-
tive or not.
∂V1
∂I1
= (1 − α)[(1 − α)I1]−α[ L¯I12(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)
]α
+ [(1 − α)I1]1−αα[ L¯I12(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)
]α−1
. [
L¯
2(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)
− L¯I1N¯ f1
2(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)2
]
= (1 − α)[(1 − α)I1]−α[ L¯I12(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)
]α
+ [(1 − α)I1]1−αα[ L¯I12(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)
]α−1
. [
L¯I1
2(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)
] > 0
2.10.4 Tax rate with a linear H(.)
Let us assume that the function H(.) is as follows
H(k) = a + bk; a, b > 0, b > 1
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Then the poor will benefit from an increase in tax after an increase in income
inequality if and only if the following condition holds
H(t′[N¯ f1
αβI1
(1 + t′)
+ N¯ f2
αI2
(1 + t′)
])[(1 − α)δI3]1−α[ kδI3L¯
2(1 + t′)
4(N¯ f1βI1 + N¯ f2 I2)
]α
≥ H(t[N¯ f1
αI1
(1 + t)
+ N¯ f2
αI2
(1 + t)
])[(1 − α)I3]1−α[ kI3L¯
2(1 + t)
4(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)
]α
Using the function H mentioned above, this condition boils down to
(a + b(t′[N¯ f1
αβI1
(1 + t′)
+ N¯ f2
αI2
(1 + t′)
]))[(1 − α)δI3]1−α[ kδI3L¯
2(1 + t′)
4(N¯ f1βI1 + N¯ f2 I2)
]α
≥ (a + b(t[N¯ f1
αI1
(1 + t)
+ N¯ f2
αI2
(1 + t)
]))[(1 − α)I3]1−α[ kI3L¯
2(1 + t)
4(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)
]α
=⇒ (a + b(t′[N¯ f1
αβI1
(1 + t′)
+ N¯ f2
αI2
(1 + t′)
]))δ(
1 + t′
(N¯ f1βI1 + N¯ f2 I2)
)α
≥ (a + b(t[N¯ f1
αI1
(1 + t)
+ N¯ f2
αI2
(1 + t)
]))(
1 + t
(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)
)α
=⇒ (1 + t
′
1 + t
)α ≥
((a + b(t[N¯ f1
αI1
(1+t) + N¯ f2
αI2
(1+t) ]))
((a + b(t′[N¯ f1
αβI1
(1+t′) + N¯ f2
αI2
(1+t′) ]))
(
(N¯ f1βI1 + N¯ f2 I2)
(N¯ f1 I1 + N¯ f2 I2)
)α
1
δ
94
 95 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
The Effects of Construction Cost Differentials on City Equilibrium in a 
Monocentric City Set Up 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In the world of rapid urbanization, the number of cities around the globe is rapidly 
increasing. But with rising number of cities and the constant influx of population into 
the cities, the governments of the respective countries face problems in several 
dimensions. In most cases the cities are not well equipped in terms of infrastructure 
facilities like roads, housing, access to public facilities etc, which leave different 
income groups in the population with disproportionate levels of standard of living. 
Even if one accounts for the income differences among individuals, a new city has 
differential costs of construction at different places in the city which also creates 
additional hurdles in the development of the city. If one looks at two big cities like Rio 
De Jenerio (Brazil) and Mumbai (India), historical evidence suggests that slums 
developed in areas where construction costs were high (for example the hills in Rio or 
the marsh lands in Mumbai) and therefore the poor people occupied those lands and 
lived under miserable conditions. In Rio De Jenerio, the favela developed on the hilly 
part of Rio in the late 19th century when homeless poor individuals started living in 
those places. As pointed out by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics 
(IBGE) in 2010, that about 6 percent of the Brazilian population lived in slums, which 
implies that 11.4 million of the 190 million people that lived in the country resided in 
areas lacking the basic amenities and were disproportionately exposed to 
environmental disaster. Similar situations gave rise to slums in Mumbai as well during 
the early 19th century under the colonial rule. Slums like Dharavi (one of the largest in 
the world) grew up in the marsh lands of Mumbai as the colonial rulers did not deem it 
fit for their stay and left it for the poor immigrants and locals. 
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According to UN-HABITAT, around 33% of the urban population in the developing 
world in 2012, or about 863 million people, lived in slums. Census data projections 
show that India’s slum population will surge to 104 million by 2017 - or around 9% of 
the total projected national population of 1.28 billion that year. Census data also shows 
how a large section of the urban population lives in slums in the four metropolitan 
cities – as high as 41.3% in Greater Mumbai, 29.6% in Kolkata, 28% in Chennai and 
about 15% in Delhi. Therefore, coupled with the fact that economic development of 
developing countries leads to higher urban population and to the emergence of new 
cities, it also leads to higher slum population in the respective countries. 
 
There is an extensive literature which tries to point out the various reasons and ways in 
which the population is segregated in the city. Segregation might be caused by 
differences in income, changes in the transportation technology, rise in income 
inequality and many others. There are multiple papers which use the monocentric city 
model and explore how changes in income, transportation technology change the 
equilibrium of the city. In this paper, we explicitly model housing suppliers and show 
that it might not be the case that households with the highest bid-rent at any distance 
from the Central Business District get to live on that place. This is where we deviate 
from the literature and show that differences in quality of housing and differences in 
cost of production of those qualities yield a different equilibrium to what we would 
have got in the absence of those features. This might help us in explaining why certain 
sections of the population live in certain areas of the city. 
 
3.2 Literature Review 
 
There is an extensive literature which attempts to study the formation of segregated 
neighborhoods and related policies. Hoff and Sen (2005) shows how in the presence of 
the private provision of public good, individuals sort themselves into different 
communities according to income. On the other hand, Brueckner and Selod (2009) 
considers informal settlements as those which are not paying shows and shows that 
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policies aimed at complete formalization of the city might affect the rich or the 
previously formal settlers negatively. Hoy and Jimenez (1991) proposes a theoretical 
model which predicts commonly observed squatter characteristics like landowners not 
collecting rents from squatters etc. Turnbull (2004) shows that the occurrence of 
squatter population can be explained by landowner’s decision to not exercise property 
rights and not so much by incomplete land markets. Brueckner (2013) and Shah 
(2013) extends this literature by considering rent-seeking squatter organizers and 
squatting in free government land. 
 
We also have the hedonic style models initiated by Rosen (1974) which has been 
widely used in the literature. The basic structure of these class of model emphasizes 
that things like price of housing is not just the price of the house, but any price of 
house observed in reality is a composite index of several prices and the function which 
links several prices to the composite price may be non-linear. Moreover there is 
empirical evidence supporting this view. The other class of models is the monocentric 
city models which was developed in the 1960’s and 1970’s (see Alonso (1964), Mills 
(1972) and Muth (1969)). The major criticisms to the monocentric city models is the 
argument that cities are polycentric. Well, this cannot be denied, but one can also not 
deny that monocentric city is a fair assumption for most cities around the globe. 
LeRoy and Sonstelie (1983) shows that the transportation technology can change a 
city’s dynamics completely where by the rich who can afford cars can choose to stay 
in the outskirts of the city. Bertaud and Brueckner (2003) analysis building height 
restriction in a closed monocentric city set-up. 
 
Coming to the policy issues of slum redevelopment Bento etal (2008) tries to analyze 
a policy of improving housing in situ versus relocation. Recently Barnhardt etal (2015) 
shows that if even slum dwellers are given the opportunity to move to better locations 
or better houses, they might not choose to because of neighborhood considerations and 
even those who choose to move might be worse off due to destruction of social capital 
and this points out that simple policies of relocation might not work. 
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3.3 Model 
In this section, we will discuss the basic assumptions in the model. We have primarily 
two sides in the model, the demand side and the supply side. The demand side is 
comprised of housing consumers of two types, households who are rich and 
households who are poor and the supply side is comprised of two types of suppliers, 
one which specializes in production of high quality housing and one which specializes 
in production of low quality housing. The following two sections discusses the 
assumptions and implications of the demand side and supply side of our model.  
 
3.3.1 Demand Side 
 
We consider a simple model with two groups of households in an open monocentric 
city model. We have rich households with income  and poor households with 
income . Since this is an open city model, how many households of each type, the 
city will accommodate will be determined when we solve the model. We also assume 
that the size or quantity of a house is fixed. Housing differs only in one aspect and that 
is housing quality. Housing quality can be of two types: high quality housing denoted 
by  and low quality housing denoted by . To simplify our model, we further 
assume that rich households consume high quality housing and poor households 
consume low quality housing. It is important to note that the model would not change 
a lot if we do not assume this and allow both types of households to consume both 
types of housing.  
 
All city residents travel to the Central Business District (CBD) for work. There are 
two modes of transportation available in the city: the bus denoted by  and the car 
denoted by . Households can choose to travel by public transportation which is the 
bus or can choose to travel by private transportation which is the car.  
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Travelling cost: - 
• Car:                                             
• Bus:   for  . 
 denote the distance a household lives away from the CBD and hence that is the 
distance it must travel to work. There are three types of costs involved in travelling. 
We have the fixed cost of choosing any mode of transport (denoted by ), the variable 
cost of transportation (denoted by ) and the time cost of travelling (denoted by ). 
The variable cost varies with how far the households stays away from the CBD and 
similarly the time cost accounts for income the households is giving up because of 
staying away from the CBD and travelling to work. We make some more assumptions 
on the travelling costs because each transportation mode has its own benefits and 
costs. 
 
Assumptions on the transportation costs: 
•  
•  
•  
These assumptions basically mean that travelling by bus has a higher fixed cost in 
comparison to bus, but time and variable cost is less if one chooses car as opposed to 
bus.  Comparing the costs involved in the two transportation modes, a household 
choose with mode of transportation to use. A household staying at a distance  from 
the CBD chooses bus over car if and only if the following is true 
 
  . 
 
Therefore, under the assumption that travelling by bus involves more time and 
variable cost and the fixed cost of travelling by car is higher than the bus, we will find 
 such that households staying at a distance   from the CBD are indifferent between 
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the two modes of transportation. This implies that if at a certain distance  from the 
CBD, the rich prefer bus, then the poor will also prefer bus at that . This happens 
because the income of the rich  is greater than the income of the poor .  
Since we have assumed that the rich consume high quality of housing  and the 
poor consumes low quality of housing , the household will try to maximize its 
consumption of non-housing good . As has been assumed in Brock and Wrede 
(2008), we assume that housing consumption does not enter the utility function. So, 
the utility of a household living at a distance  from the CBD has utility  
(1) , 
for  and .  denote the rent at a distance  from the CBD. 
Since we have an open city model, we can assume that each type of household will 
attain the same utility level, so we can equate equation (1) to the exogenously given 
indirect utilities to get the bid-rent functions. The bid-rent functions would be as 
follows 
 
 
In this section, we will modify the utility of the rich households to incorporate for the 
negative externality they get because of the existence of the low quality housing. Let 
 be the total low quality housing in the city. This to also the total number of poor 
households in the city since we have assumed that only the poor households consume 
low quality housing . For simplicity, we assume that the disutility due to the low 
quality housing in the city enters linearly in the utility function of the rich households, 
which implies the utility of the rich household living at a distance  from the CBD is  
 for . 
 captures the intensity of the disutility of having low quality housing in the city. 
Hence the bid-rent functions of the rich households are  
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Now, we will take a step back, and work with the bid-rent functions when there is no 
negative externality and look at the different situations that can occur. Note that from 
our discussion on the choice of transportation mode, we can get the bid-rent function 
for each type of household. We have shown that we can find  for , such that 
households staying at a distance   from the CBD are indifferent between the two 
modes of transportation. The following diagram shows how for each type of 
household we get the bid-rent function across different distances  from the CBD. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 
 
We see that after  the slope of the bid-rent function for either type of household 
changes because of the change in choice of transportation modes. Also, as mentioned 
before, since   , , because the rich 
households have higher income. When we bring the bid-rent functions of the two 
types of households together, we can get a complete picture of the different situations 
that can arise. Just for the sake of discussion, let us temporarily assume that land is 
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only used for building houses and therefore housing developers are willing to produce 
housing if the bid-rent is positive. We will relax this assumption later, when we solve 
for the equilibrium. Also, note that unlike Brock and Wrede (2008), the bid-rent 
functions from the demand side would not tell us about the location pattern in the 
equilibrium because in our model we have two types of housing quality and we will 
model the housing supply side differently. Our discussion on the supply of housing 
will make it clear how our assumptions on the housing developers will affect location 
patterns in equilibrium. 
 
However, it is important to discuss what would happen if follow Brock and Wrede 
(2008) and assume that whoever has the higher bid gets to stay at that place and 
housing of that quality is produced at that . More formally, final rent at a distance  
from the CBD is . 
 
Case 1: Poor live near the CBD, poor use bus and rich use car.  
The following diagram depicts the situation when poor households live closer to the 
CBD, the poor households choose bus for transportation and the rich households use 
car for transportation. 
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Figure 3.2 
 
 in the diagram above is the point beyond which the bid-rent of the rich dominate that 
of the poor. The condition which characterizes  is as follows 
 
 
The conditions which needs to be satisfied such that we have the situation described in 
the diagrams are: 
•   which means that at the border between the poor and the 
rich, the poor household’s bid-rent when they take the bus should be steeper 
than the rich household’s bid-rent function when they take the car. 
•  which means that at distance zero from the CBD, the 
bid-rent of the poor household dominate that of the rich. 
 
Case 2: Poor live near the CBD, poor use bus, rich use both bus and car 
The following diagram depicts the situation where poor live closer to the CBD and use 
the bus for transportation. Beyond , upto , the rich households use the bus as a 
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mode of transport and rich households living at a distance , use car for 
transportation. 
 
 
Figure 3.3 
 
Similarly, as before,  in the diagram above is the point beyond which the bid-rent of 
the rich dominate that of the poor. The condition which characterizes  is as follows 
 
 
The conditions which needs to be satisfied such that we have the situation described in 
the diagrams are: 
•   which means that at the border between the poor and the 
rich, the poor household’s bid-rent when they take the bus should be steeper 
than the rich household’s bid-rent function when they take the bus. 
•  which means that at distance zero from the CBD, the 
bid-rent of the poor household dominate that of the rich. 
 
Case 3: Poor live near the CBD, poor use bus and car, rich use car. 
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The following diagram depicts the situation where the poor live closer to the CBD and 
poor households living at a distance  use bus to commute to work. Poor 
households living at a distance , where , use car to commute to the CBD 
for work. Rich households living at a distance , such that , use car to commute 
to the CBD for work.   
 
 
Figure 3.4 
 
 in this diagram is the point beyond which the bid-rent of the rich dominate that of 
the poor. The condition which characterizes  is as follows 
 
The conditions which needs to be satisfied such that we have the situation described in 
the diagrams are: 
•   which means that at the border between the poor and the 
rich, the poor household’s bid-rent when they take the car should be steeper 
than the rich household’s bid-rent function when they take the car. 
•  which means that at distance zero from the CBD, the 
bid-rent of the poor household dominate that of the rich. 
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Case 4: Rich live near the CBD, rich use bus and poor use car.  
The following diagram depicts the situation when rich households live closer to the 
CBD, the rich households choose bus for transportation and the poor households use 
car for transportation. 
 
 
Figure 3.5 
 
 in the diagram above is the point beyond which the bid-rent of the poor dominate 
that of the rich. The condition which characterizes  is as follows 
 
The conditions which needs to be satisfied such that we have the situation described in 
the diagrams are: 
•   which means that at the border between the poor and the 
rich, the rich household’s bid-rent when they take the bus should be steeper 
than the poor household’s bid-rent function when they take the car. 
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•  which means that at distance zero from the CBD, the 
bid-rent of the rich household dominate that of the poor. 
 
 Case 5: Rich live near the CBD, rich use bus, poor use both bus and car 
The following diagram depicts the situation where rich live closer to the CBD and use 
the bus for transportation. Beyond , upto , the poor households use the bus as a 
mode of transport and poor households living at a distance , use car for 
transportation. 
 
Figure 3.6 
 
Similarly, as before,  in the diagram above is the point beyond which the bid-rent of 
the poor dominate that of the rich. The condition which characterizes  is as follows 
 
The conditions which needs to be satisfied such that we have the situation described in 
the diagrams are: 
•   which means that at the border between the poor and the 
rich, the rich household’s bid-rent when they take the bus should be steeper 
than the poor household’s bid-rent function when they take the bus. 
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•  which means that at distance zero from the CBD, the 
bid-rent of the rich household dominate that of the poor. 
 
Case 6: Rich live near the CBD, rich use bus and car, poor use car. 
The following diagram depicts the situation where the rich live closer to the CBD and 
rich households living at a distance  use bus to commute to work. Rich 
households living at a distance , where , use car to commute to the CBD 
for work. Poor households living at a distance , such that , use car to commute 
to the CBD for work.   
 
 
 
Figure 3.7 
 
 in this diagram is the point beyond which the bid-rent of the poor dominate that of 
the rich. The condition which characterizes  is as follows 
 
The conditions which needs to be satisfied such that we have the situation described in 
the diagrams are: 
•   which means that at the border between the poor and the 
rich, the rich household’s bid-rent when they take the car should be steeper 
than the poor household’s bid-rent function when they take the car. 
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•  which means that at distance zero from the CBD, the 
bid-rent of the rich household dominate that of the poor. 
 
Case 7: The following diagram shows a slightly more complicated scenario where the 
rich live closer to the CBD and take the bus. Then after a point ( ) poor households 
live and take the bus to travel but this changes at ( ), where the bid rent of the rich 
dominates that of the poor again and the rich use car for transportation. 
 
Figure 3.8 
 
 and  are characterized by the following two equations: 
• , 
•  
 
The conditions which needs to be satisfied such that we have the situation described in 
the diagrams are: 
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•   which means that at the border (at ) between the poor 
and the rich, the rich household’s bid-rent when they take the bus should be 
steeper than the poor household’s bid-rent function when they take the bus. 
•   which means that at the border (at ) between the poor 
and the rich, the poor household’s bid-rent when they take the bus should be 
steeper than the rich household’s bid-rent function when they take the car. 
•  which means that at distance zero from the CBD, the 
bid-rent of the rich household dominate that of the poor. 
 
3.3.2 Supply Side 
 
On the supply side of the model, we have two types of housing suppliers, one 
specializes in the production of low quality housing and the other specializing in the 
production of high quality housing. Given, the assumptions of the demand side of the 
model, we know that the housing supplier which specializes in the production of high 
quality housing will only build houses for the rich and the housing supplier 
specializing in low quality housing will produce houses for the poor. Land is owned 
by absentee landlords and land is given to the housing supplier who gives higher 
returns to the landlord. The housing suppliers have a CRS production function and the 
profits of the housing suppliers at any distance  from the CBD are given by the 
following equation: 
 
where  and . Because of constant returns, housing output per unit 
of land can be expressed as , where  is the concave intensive form of the 
housing production per unit of land at distance  from the CBD, and  is the 
capital-to-land ratio at distance   from the CBD, referred to as structural density. 
 denotes the cost of building high or low quality housing at a distance  from the 
CBD.  denotes the return to the landlord. The housing supplier chooses  to 
 111 
 
maximize profits. The cost of production of the housing suppliers has two 
components: a fixed cost which does not vary with the distance and another 
component of the cost function varies with distance from the CBD. More specifically 
the cost function is: 
 
For  We also assume that  which implies that the fixed cost of 
producing high quality of housing is higher than the fixed cost of production of low 
quality housing. We also assume that   The housing suppliers choose  to 
maximize their profits. The optimality condition for the housing suppliers is as 
follows: 
 
Since the housing suppliers earn zero profits, so the return to the landlord  is given 
by the following expression  
 
 
Note that, return to the landlord determines which type of housing supplier gets to 
build on a plot of land. From the previous analysis, it is not clear whether  
dominates  or vice-versa. 
 
To make the analysis more tractable, we will make some simplifying assumptions. In 
this model, we have assumed that the rich want good quality housing and the poor 
want low quality housing. Moreover, the quantity of housing is also fixed. Therefore, 
the housing supplier’s problem boils down to simply choosing the number of 
households that can reside at a distance  from the CBD. Let us assume that, 
 
The housing suppliers choose  to maximize profits. 
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3.3.3 Equilibrium 
 
Different Cost Function Specifications: 
 
a) In this section, we will discuss the resulting equilibrium in the city when we 
incorporate the simplified version of  Also, let the cost function be  
 
. 
The profit function of the supplier’s is 
 
One can compute the return to the landlord from the above expression and after 
simplifying we will get the following expression. 
 
and  
 
Note that if  for  and  , then he would not be willing to      
rent to either of the housing suppliers (if we assume that rent from an alternative sector 
(say farming) yields zero returns). If at some   for some value of  either  
or  is positive, then land is given for building the type of housing that yields 
higher return. Since  is an increasing function of  , if  then the 
landlord would want to increase  as much as possible and this would lead to 
 This cannot happen in equilibrium.  
 
b) In this section, we will discuss the model under a different assumption on the cost 
of production. We would like to consider a situation where are cost of construction 
takes the following form: 
 
This implies that the profit function of housing suppliers would be given by, 
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The housing supplier chooses  to maximize profits. Since land is given to the 
supplier who gives the highest return to the landlord, so both the suppliers will be 
willing to give the maximum amount that they can. 
Maximizing the above expression with respect to  gives us the optimal value of 
 Therefore, 
 
which can explicitly be written as  
 
and 
 
 
Note that, since , if and if , then we can say for sure that land 
would be given to the high type supplier. On the contrary, if ,  then  the 
low type housing supplier would get the land. The condition for this to happen is  
 
 
Let us discuss two of the scenarios that we discussed before, specifically Cases 3 and 
6. Note that from the previous analysis, we know that high quality housing supplier 
will get the land to build unless the squared ratio of the low and high quality housing 
is greater than the ratio of high to low quality housing.  
Case 3:   Recall the bid-rent function in case 3. 
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Figure 3.9 
 
Note that the difference between the low and high quality bid-rents are highest at a 
distance of zero from the CBD and decreases thereafter. So, if  
 
then, we will see low quality housing being built in the city. Otherwise, there would 
not be any low quality housing in the city. If the condition above holds, then there will 
exist some  such that,  
 
 
So, in equilibrium, there will be low quality housing upto to distance  from the CBD 
and beyond that there will be low quality housing. Note that, one can easily prove that 
 
 
In equilibrium, the number of poor and rich households the city can accommodate is 
as follows: 
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where  represents the point where the bid-rent function reaches zero (in this case, the 
bid-rent of the rich taking the car to work).  
 
Proposition 3.1 Under the situation as in Case 3, the city will be able to accommodate 
poor people only if  , otherwise there will be no poor people in the city. 
 
Case 6: Recall the bid-rent in case 6. 
 
Figure 3.10 
 
In this case, the high quality bid-rent dominates the low quality from the beginning, so 
upto , there will be high quality housing. Beyond  , there is scope for low quality 
housing and that will be built only if the condition for low-quality building is met. 
In this situation, we will have rich people living upto a distance of  for sure, but 
beyond , where the bid-rent of the poor dominate the rich, it might be the case that 
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high quality housing is build and the rich people stay. Once again let be such that  
 
 
One can easily show that,  Also let us denote , such that . We can 
say for sure that beyond , only low quality housing would be built and the poor will 
stay over there. Again, in equilibrium the number of rich and poor households the city 
can accommodate is as follows: 
 
 
Where  represents the point where the bid-rent function reaches zero (in this case, the 
bid-rent of the rich taking the car to work).  
 
Proposition 3.2 Under the situation as in Case 3, the city will always have poor 
people in the city.  
 
c) In this case, we augment the cost of production further, and is 
 
Therefore, the profit function of the housing suppliers would be  
 
Using a similar procedure, to the case above we will have the returns to the landlord as 
follows: 
 
and 
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Note that, with the new cost function specification in this section, low quality housing 
will be built only if the following condition is satisfied: 
 
 
Let us again recall cases 3 and 6 for further discussion. For the sake of simplicity in 
discussion, let us denote  as . Note that  but , which implies that 
 or .  
 
i)  Note that carefully looking at the bid-rent equation in Case 3, we can see that 
at , the poor outbids the rich but for the poor to stay there, the difference 
between the bid-rent functions should be such that  
 
Let us assume that . Since the difference between the bid-rent functions 
are decreasing, there will be a point some  such that  
 
 
In equilibrium, the number of poor and rich households the city can accommodate is 
as follows: 
 
 
Where  represents the point where the bid-rent function reaches zero (in this case, the 
bid-rent of the rich taking the car to work).  
 118 
 
 
ii)  When , we see that the bid-rent functions dictate who lives where, that 
is the difference is quality of housing and the difference in construction cost of the two 
types of housing is such that they cancel each other’s impact in the model and housing 
is provided to people who have the highest bid-rent at any . 
In equilibrium, the number of poor and rich households the city can accommodate is 
as follows: 
 
 
Where  represents the point where the bid-rent function reaches zero (in this case, the     
bid-rent of the rich taking the car to work).  
iii)  In this situation, since , we can say for sure, that poor households 
will live in the city. Since the bid-rent of the poor is higher than that of the rich for all 
, we know that there will be a point some  such that  
 
One can easily show that  Therefore in equilibrium, the number of poor and rich 
households the city can accommodate is as follows: 
 
 
where  represents the point where the bid-rent function reaches zero (in this case, the 
bid-rent of the rich taking the car to work).  
The observations in this section is summarized in the propositions below. 
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Proposition 3.3 Augmenting the model, to include for construction cost heterogeneity, 
we find that results crucially depend on the ratio  Also, only when , we 
can have a situation when there are no poor households in the city. Similarly, only 
when , we can have a situation when there are no rich households in the city.  
 
Proposition 3.4 K is crucial in determining the number of rich or poor households 
that will live in the city. Number of poor households in the city is directly proportional 
to K, and number of rich households in the city is inversely proportional to K. 
 
One can do a similar analysis for Case 6 as well, but it would be identical to the 
previous section, only the roles for the rich and the poor would be reversed.  
 
 
3.4 Comparative Statics 
 
In this section, we will extend the analysis by looking at how the outcome of the 
model changes if there are changes to the costs of construction. Let us continue the 
discussion using Case 3. Recall that low quality housing would be built if  
 
We denoted  as  for simplicity in exposition. Let us consider the situation 
where  changes. As before, to start with, we can be in three different situations 
depending on the value of .  
 
a)  This means that , therefore an increase in  would imply that  would 
still be greater than 1. Let us also assume that  Then, an increase in  
would increase the value of  Note that because of the increase in , the distance at 
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which   would move to the left to where it was before. As a result of 
this there would be less number of poor households in the city and more number of 
rich households in the city. On the other hand, if there is a decrease in , then the 
resulting  after the change in the cost of construction can be greater, equal or less 
than 1. If  is still greater than 1, then the distance at which   would 
move to the right to where it was before. This would imply more poor households in 
the city and less rich households in the city. If, due to decrease in ,  becomes less 
than or equal to 1, then we move to the situations discussed in the previous section. It 
would still result in more poor households in the city and less rich households. The 
interesting point to note here is the fact that as long as , the point where there is 
a shift, that is the distance from the CBD where poor people stop residing and rich 
people start to live remains to the left of  If due to decrease in ,  moves from 
greater than one to less than one, then the shifting point moves from the left of  to the 
right of  or is equal to  
 
b)  When we start from a situation where , then a decrease in would 
lead to a value of  and an increase in  would lead a value of . It is easy 
to see that in this situation an increase (decrease) in  would lead to less (more) 
number of poor households in the city.  
 
c)  The analysis of this case would be very similar to the situation discussed in 
previously in this section, it would just be in the reverse direction.  
Usually in the monocentric city models, the consumer with the highest bid-rent gets to 
stay over there. In our model, since the bid-rent alone does not decide who stays 
where, we have situations where the rich (poor) have a higher bid-rent but since high 
(low) quality housing is not provided, they are not able to stay there. As discussed 
before, the shifting point (let us denote this by  can be to the left or right of  or  
can be equal to . As we have seen in the discussion in this section, changes in  
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might lead to changes in position of   with respect to . Let us call this phenomenon 
as regime shift. 
 
Proposition 3.5 Increase (decrease) in  would lead to a decrease (increase) in the 
number of poor households in the city and increase (decrease) in the number of rich 
households in the city. The results would go in opposite direction if there is an 
increase (decrease) in . 
 
Proposition 3.6 Increase (decrease) in  would lead to changes in the value of  
which might further result in a regime shift.  
 
 
 
 
3.5 Conclusion  
 
In this paper, we have taken used the monocentric city model and have enhanced the 
model to include two types of qualities of housing with different construction costs. 
Then we carefully depict all the different shapes the bid-rent functions can take 
depending on the parameter values of the model and show the city equilibrium 
patterns for all the different case in the absence of two types of housing suppliers. 
After that we introduce two types of housing suppliers and discuss a variety of 
construction cost specifications and discuss the equilibrium of the city.  We move on 
to further enrich the model by introducing construction costs differences in building 
different types of housing and discuss two the many cases to show how the 
equilibrium changes when we include these additional features in the model. We show 
that in equilibrium, we might have situations where there are no poor households in 
the city or no rich households in the city. We also show that having the highest bid-
rent does not ensure that that household will reside in that plot, it crucially depends on 
the supply side and it be the case that the preferred quality of housing is not supplied 
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at that plot. We also show that results crucially depend on the ratio of high and low 
quality housing and the ratio of their respective construction costs. We also perform a 
comparative static analysis where we consider changes in the cost of construction of 
different types of housing. We find that changes in construction costs changes the 
number of rich and poor households the city can accommodate and moreover it might 
also cause changes in regimes. Overall, this paper contributes to the literature by 
incorporating new features in a monocentric city model and showing how these 
features contribute to the new equilibrium. One can also take this model as a base and 
further introduce construction cost differential across city space and further enrich the 
model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 123 
 
3.6 References 
 
1. Alonso, W. (1964) “Location and land use”, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
2. Barnhardt, S., Field, E., & Pande, R. (2017) “Moving to Opportunity or Isolation? 
Network Effects of a Slum Relocation Program in India”, American Economic 
Journal: Applied Economics, Volume 9, pp. 1-32. 
 
3. Bento, A. M., Takeuchi, A., & Cropper, M. (2008), “The Welfare Effects of Urban 
Land Use Policies on Slum Dwellers: The case of Mumbai, India”, Journal of Urban 
Economics, Volume 64, pp. 65-84. 
4. Bertaud, A., & Brueckner, J. (2004), “Analyzing Building-Height Restrictions: 
Predicted Impacts, Welfare Costs, and a Case Study of Bangalore, India”, Policy 
Research Working Paper 3290, World Bank. 
5. Brueckner, J. (2013), “Urban Squatting with Rent-Seeking Organizers”, Regional 
Science and Urban Economics, Volume 43, pp. 561-569. 
6. Brueckner, J. A., & Selod, H. (2009), “A Theory of Urban Squatting and Land-
Tenure Formalization in Developing Countries”, American Economic Journal: 
Economic Policy, Volume 1, pp. 28-51. 
7. Hoff, K., & Sen, A. (2005), “Homeownership, Community Interactions, and 
Segregation”, American Economic Review, Volume 95, pp. 1167-1189. 
8. Hoy, M. & Jimenez, E. (1991), “Squatters’ Rights and Urban Development: An 
Economic Perspective” Economica, Volume 58, pp. 79-92. 
9. LeRoy, S., & Sonstelie, J. (1983), “Paradise Lost and Regained: Transportation 
Innovation, Income and Residential Location”, Journal of Urban Economics, Volume 
13, pp. 67-89. 
10. Mills, E.S. (1967), “An Aggregative Model of Resource Allocation in a 
Metropolitan Area”, American Economic Review, Volume 57, pp. 197-210. 
11. Muth, R.F. (1969), “Cities and housing”, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
12. Rosen, S. (1974), “Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Differentiation in 
Pure Competition”, Journal of Political Economy, Volume 82, pp. 34-55. 
13. Shah, N. (2014), “Squatting on Government Land”, Journal of Regional Science, 
Volume 54, pp. 114-136. 
 124 
 
14. Turnbull, G. K., (2004) “Squatting, Eviction and Development”, Regional Science 
and Urban Economics, Volume 38, pp. 1-15. 
